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INTRODUCTION
One of the best ways for a corporation to win litigation is to
make sure the courthouse doors never open for the plaintiff in
the first place. Consequently, corporations favor the argument
that a court lacks personal jurisdiction; this argument has
proven a useful tool in achieving victory.' An inquiry whether a
corporation was subject to a court's personal jurisdiction, tra-
ditionally, was complex and uncertain-great fodder for a law-
school exam. 2 Luckily for corporations such as Amazon, Inc.,
the Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding personal juris-
diction transformed what was often a nightmare for law stu-
dents into a relatively simple matter. The Court simplified and
restricted personal jurisdiction.
First, the Court narrowed general jurisdiction.3 In 2014,
with the Court's decision in Daimler AG v. Baumar,4 the Su-
preme Court put an end to the "doing business" test by essen-
tially holding that a corporation is only subject to general
jurisdiction in the corporation's principal place of business or
the corporation's state of incorporation.5 A fact-intensive in-
1 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-96
(1980) (holding that Oklahoma state courts did not have personal jurisdiction over
corporate defendants when plaintiffs were involved in an automobile accident in
Oklahoma while using defendants' product).
2 Briefly, courts today treat personal jurisdiction as consisting of two catego-
ries: general and specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction applies when a lawsuit
is unrelated to a defendant's contacts (activities) to the forum state. 4 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (4th
ed. 2008) ("When the cause of action sued on does not arise from or relate to the
defendant's contacts with the forum state, an assertion of general jurisdiction
must be predicated on contacts that are sufficiently continuous and systematic to
justify haling the defendant into a court in that state."). General jurisdiction is
synonymous with all-purpose jurisdiction. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 121 (2014). On the other hand, specific jurisdiction is predicated on a
lawsuit relating directly to a defendant's contacts with the forum state; the law-
suit is specific to the relation between the defendant and the state. 4 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 2, § 1067.5. The Court hinted at this distinction in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945), and Arthur T. von
Mehren and Donald T. Trautman explicitly advocated for the distinction in Juris-
diction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966). In
1986, the Court discussed the two types of personal jurisdiction as a legal reality
for the first time in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984). 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1067.5.
3 See Hinrichs v. Gen. Motors of Can., Ltd., 222 So. 3d 1114, 1124 (Ala.
2016) ("The United States Supreme Court subsequently amplified its restriction of
the scope of general jurisdiction in Dainler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. [1171 ...
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2291 (2017).
4 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
5 See infra subpart I.B.
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quiry with few Supreme Court cases, a recipe for litigation,6
became "dead letter."7 Second, the Court narrowed specific
jurisdiction. In 2017, with the Court's decision in Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court," the Court ended a brand of plain-
tiff forum shopping that had been a thorn in corporations'
sides.9 Corporations are less likely to be in court in 2018 than
they were in 2010.
There are, however, still battles to be fought. One of the
next battlegrounds, on which the initial forays have already
begun in the lower courts,1 0 returns to general jurisdiction.
The foundation of the argument, however, begins with subject-
matter jurisdiction. In 2010's Hertz Corp. v. Friend," the Su-
preme Court held that a corporation's "principal place of busi-
ness," in regard to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, means the corporation's
"nerve center": "the place where a corporation's officers direct,
control, and coordinate the corporation's activities."1 2 The
6 The few Supreme Court holdings on general jurisdiction left the subject
open to interpretation. See infra subpart I.B. Daimler, however, very likely made
formerly common arguments unviable. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814
F.3d 619, 629 (2d Cir. 2016) ("At that time, the Court's 2011 decision in Goodyear
seemed to have left open the possibility that contacts of substance, deliberately
undertaken and of some duration, could place a corporation 'at home' in many
locations. But Daimler, decided in 2014, considerably altered the analytic land-
scape for general jurisdiction and left little room for these arguments.").
7 Tanya J. Monestier, Where Is Home Depot "At Home"?: Daimler v. Bauman
and the End ofDoing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 265 (2014) ("The
message in Daimler has come through loud and clear: doing business jurisdiction
is a dead letter."). A "dead letter" is a "law or practice that, although not formally
abolished, is no longer used, observed, or enforced." Dead Letter, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
9 As will be discussed below, the decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb dealt a
blow to "litigation tourism." See Richard A. Dean & Katya S. Cronin, Bristol-
Myers Squibb v. Superior Court: The Last Nail in the Coffin ofStream-of-Commerce
Personal Jurisdiction, 60 DRI FOR DEF. 22, 25 (2018) ("In essence, [Bristol-Myers
Squibb] deals a fatal blow to the refrain that the new economic realities of global-
ization mean that a company with a national distribution network can be sued in
any state of a plaintiffs choosing.").
1o Compare Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Co. SA, 263 F. Supp. 3d
498, 503 (D. Del. 2017) (applying the Hertz nerve center test), with Barnett v.
Surefire Med., No. JFM-17-1332, 2017 WL 4279497, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2017)
(assessing general jurisdiction without reference to Hertz). It is important to note
that there are procedural mechanisms that externally affect this jurisdictional
battle. For example, multidistrict litigation, by which hundreds of thousands of
federal cases have been consolidated (based only on a single common question of
fact), is exempt from the requirements of personal jurisdiction; plaintiffs can use
this mechanism to their advantage. See Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category,
105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming July 2020) (manuscript at 1-2, 6, 20) (on file
with author).
11 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
12 Id. at 92-93. The Court noted that it was adopting and expanding the
traditional nerve center test as explained by Judge Edward Weinfeld of the South-
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Court adopted the nerve center test to define a corporation's
"principal place of business" for subject-matter jurisdiction for
three reasons: Congress wrote the statute' 3 to define the place
of business in the singular and the nerve center test easily
identifies a single location; 4 the nerve center test was the most
simple option and simplicity is key for jurisdictional statutes; ' 5
and, according to the legislative history, Congress intended for
the test to be at least as simple as a gross-income test.1 6 While
definitively settling the debate over how to determine a corpora-
tion's principal place of business for subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, the Hertz opinion said nothing about personal
jurisdiction.
In light of Daimler's restriction of general jurisdiction, in
almost all cases, to a corporation's principal place of business
and state of incorporation, the definition of principal place of
business is now critical to general jurisdiction. Only the princi-
pal place of business and the third category-the exceptional
case-provide potential doctrinal flexibility. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, who authored the Court's decision in Daimler,
noted that an exceptional case in which "a corporation's opera-
tions in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or
principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a
nature as to render the corporation at home"' 7 is theoretically
possible, but the exceptional case has proven quite elusive.' 8
ern District of New York in 1959. See id. at 89-90 (citing Scot Typewriter Co. v.
Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) ("[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a
citizen of . .. the State . . . where it has its principal place of business . ..
(emphasis added).
14 Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93-94 (reasoning that the nerve center test is congruent
with the singular statutory language of § 1332(c)(1) because "[a] corporation's
nerve center,' usually its main headquarters, is a single place").
15 1I at 94 ("Simple jurisdictional rules also promote greater predictability.
Predictability is valuable to corporations making business and investment
decisions.").
16 Id. at 95 ("That history suggests that the words 'principal place of business'
should be interpreted to be no more complex than the initial 'half of gross income'
test. A 'nerve center' test offers such a possibility. A general business activities
test does not."). The gross-income test determined that a corporation was a citi-
zen of any state in which "it received more than half of its gross income." Id. at
86-87. Thus, under a gross-income test corporations would argue that they had
less than this threshold in order to attempt to defeat personal jurisdiction. Inso-
far as a traditional contacts test under general jurisdiction is similar to a gross-
income test because of the nature of the contacts inquiry, it stands to reason that
the nerve center test is similarly simpler than a contacts inquiry.
17 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 154 n.9 (2014).
18 See Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014)
("It is, therefore, incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum
other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business."); James J.
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The question before the lower courts, then, is whether the
nerve center test defines the principal place of business for
general jurisdiction. While the Court clearly limited the scope
of general jurisdiction with Daimler, the Court did not define
"principal place of business." Application of the nerve center
test to general jurisdiction's principal place of business inquiry
would further restrict general jurisdiction in favor of corpora-
tions because large national and multinational corporations
would be able to tailor their activities-to choose their nerve
centers-to engage in ex ante forum shopping. Thus, to apply
the nerve center test for general jurisdiction's principal place of
business in the wake of Bristol-Myers Squibb would be to give a
forum-shopping tool to corporations after taking one away from
plaintiffs. Moreover, the policy rationales that underlie sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are not iden-
tical, so it is not simple to map Hertz's rationale onto general
jurisdiction. 19
Amazon's plan to build a second headquarters, its HQ2,
gives this doctrinal argument tangibility. Amazon, one of
America's largest corporations, is incorporated in Delaware,
has its headquarters in Washington, and is arguably most ac-
tive in California. 20 Should the nerve center test determine the
principal place of business for general jurisdiction, then Ama-
zon would be able to build their HQ2 in any state without
considering general jurisdiction because it could choose a
headquarters irrespective of actual corporate activity. Despite
having activities that dwarf those of nearly every American bus-
Dries, In Search of the Illusive Exceptional Case for the Exercise of General Juris-
diction, BAKER MCKENZIE (May 23, 2017), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/
insight/publications/2017/05/exercise-of-general-jurisdiction/ [https://perma
.cc/L8S9-6S4V]. For a recent survey of the exceptional case and its rarity in the
lower courts, see Priscilla Heinz, Comment, When Is It Necessary For Corporations
to Be Essentially At Home?: An Exploration of Exceptional Cases, 51 U. RICH. L.
REv. 1179, 1195-98 (2017).
19 See infra Part IV.
20 See infra notes 175, 193 and accompanying text.
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iness2 1 in at least three states, 2 2 Amazon could choose the
least plaintiff-friendly state for its nerve center: its HQ1, its
HQ2, the state where it has the highest quantum of activity, or
even a different state where its only activity is corporate
direction.
Since its inception, personal jurisdiction doctrine has
evolved with the modem economy. 23 Applying the nerve center
test to general jurisdiction would be a departure from the norm
because modem corporations would escape jurisdiction de-
spite historical trends pointing toward an opposite result. In
search of clarity, the doctrine is now suspended between
Daimler's warning that a court cannot deem a corporation at
home simply because it does business there and Justice Sonia
Sotomayor's concurrent warning that a strict reading of
Daimler renders corporations like Amazon "too big" for personal
jurisdiction. 2 4 This Note identifies a middle ground, derived
21 Amazon is "the biggest corporate employer in Seattle, and it occupies 19
percent of the prime office space in the city, more than any other employer in a big
American city." Nick Wingfield & Patricia Cohen, Amazon Plans Second Head-
quarters, Opening Bidding War Among Cities, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 7, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/technology/amazon-headquarters-north-
america.html [https://perma.cc/ZD8J-58DL]. "Today, half of all U.S. households
are subscribed to the membership program Amazon Prime, half of all online
shopping searches start directly on Amazon, and Amazon captures nearly one in
every two dollars that Americans spend online. Amazon sells more books, toys,
and by next year, apparel and consumer electronics than any retailer online or
off . . . ." Laura Heller, Amazon's Growing Power in the U.S. Economy, FORBES
(Nov. 30, 2016, 1:49 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/lauraheller/2016/11/
30/amazons-growing-stranglehold-on-the-us-economy/#c2691deeb4O8 [https:/
/perma.cc/688A-B9ZGI.
22 Justice Sotomayor raised this concern, that the jurisdictional law will treat
large businesses differently (and arguably more favorably) than small businesses,
in her concurrence in Daimler-that opinion, however, was arguing against Jus-
tice Ginsburg's proportional contacts test (different, but not unrelated to, adopt-
ing the nerve center test for general jurisdiction). See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 145
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also infra note 109 and accompanying text (con-
trasting Justice Ginsburg's restricted understanding of general jurisdiction in
Daimler, employing the proportional contacts test, with Howard M. Erichson's
expanded definition of principal place of business for the purposes of general
jurisdiction that takes into account absolute business conducted in several states
and a variant of the nerve center test).
23 See infra notes 178-182 and accompanying text; see also Meir
Feder, Goodyear, "Home," and the Uncertain Future ofDoing Business Jurisdiction,
63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 681-83 (2012) (discussing the evolving interpretation of
personal jurisdiction in case law).
24 See infra Parts V & VI. This proposal is not necessarily the only mecha-
nism by which courts may maintain or expand the breadth of general jurisdiction.
Most avenues, however, do not seem passable. See, e.g., Gorton v. Air & Liquid
Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 296 (M.D. Pa. 2018) ("Since Daimler, a majority
of federal courts have held that general jurisdiction may not be based solely upon
a corporation's compliance with a state's registration statute."); First Franchise
Capital Corp. v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-397, 2017 WL 3269260, at *13
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wholly from existing case law pre- and post-Daimler, aimed at
closing the gap between the two poles: the contacts plus test.
First, courts should apply the nerve center test for general
jurisdiction's principal place of business, despite counter-
vailing policy arguments, to simplify the inquiry by shifting all
questions of contacts into the exceptional case. Second, courts
should begin to explore the contours of Dainler's exceptional
case by assessing a corporation's absolute level of contacts, in
accordance with historical precedent, in conjunction with an
assessment of unique attributes that point in favor of subject-
ing the corporation to a State's jurisdiction.25
This proposal would fall well inside Justice Ginsburg's di-
rective that a company like Amazon should not be subject to
suit in all fifty states while also remaining mindful of Justice
Sotomayor's warning that to ossify general jurisdiction by effec-
tively limiting it to two states would lead to the inequitable
result of a corporation such as Amazon's insulation from suit
in a state where it has a de facto headquarters. 26 General
jurisdiction would evolve with the modem economy, currently
populated by a small number of dominant corporations, with-
out subjecting more traditional corporations to untraditional
jurisdiction. 27 Otherwise, personal jurisdiction doctrine might
tilt too far in favor of corporations, and individuals will be una-
ble to hale economically dominant corporations into court de-
spite the corporations' lounging comfortably at home in the
individuals' state.
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I describes the gene-
sis of general jurisdiction jurisprudence from Pennoyer v.
Nefp through Daimler. Part II briefly describes the curtail-
ment of specific jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers Squibb and its
effect on personal jurisdiction. In Part III, this Note details
lower courts' treatment of general jurisdiction following
Daimler, finding that many courts are applying the nerve center
test to the principal place of business inquiry for general juris-
diction and tracing the jurisprudential roots of the contacts
plus test. Part IV argues that precedent and policy point in
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2017) (noting that plaintiffs argument that a corporation can
have more than one principal place of business was without support); infra note
148 and accompanying text (noting that Daimler and subsequent cases have
refused to apply specific jurisdiction's second step, a reasonableness inquiry, to
general jurisdiction).
25 See infra Part VI.
26 See id.
27 See infra Part V.
28 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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favor of a contacts test for principal place of business in general
jurisdiction rather than the nerve center test, but that adoption
of the nerve center test for principal place of business and the
contacts plus test for the exceptional case would generally sim-
plify the inquiry and would avoid policy concerns. Part V ex-
plores the development of the modern economy with Amazon as
a case study and demonstrates how Amazon's second head-
quarters creates an untenable problem for a general jurisdic-
tion doctrine that limits each corporation to two home states.
Part VI concludes by arguing that the simplest, most effective,
and most precedent-deferential path forward is the contacts
plus test.
I
THE GENESIS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,
grounded in the sometimes-illusory "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice,"2 9 often struggles to translate un-
derlying policy concerns into easily applicable tests. Each time
the Supreme Court issues a landmark decision regarding per-
sonal jurisdiction, attempting to clarify the doctrine for judges
and litigants alike, confusion abounds.30 On the other hand,
the Court's silence can be just as confounding. In fact, after
failing to reach a majority decision in both 1987's Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court3 1 and 1990's Burnham v. Supe-
rior Court,3 2 the Court did not take another personal jurisdic-
tion case until 201 1's Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown 3 3-twenty-one years later.3 4 After its recent pair of
decisions in Goodyear and Daimler, the Court has again left
aspects of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence open to interpre-
tation. It is unclear whether Hertz's nerve center test applies to
general jurisdiction's principal place of business, and it is un-
clear what role contacts play in light of Daimler's announce-
ment of the two paradigmatic examples of general jurisdiction.
29 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
30 See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants'
Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59
B.C. L. REv. 1251, 1268-1270 (2018) ("Over the . . . several decades [following
International Shoe] the Supreme Court sporadically decided personal-jurisdiction
cases in an attempt to put meat on the bones of the International Shoe test.").
31 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
32 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
33 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
34 Bradt & Rave, supra note 30 at 1272.
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A. International Shoe Eventually Leads to General and
Specific Jurisdiction
In order for a court to hear a particular case, the court
must have jurisdiction over the persons or property at issue-
personal jurisdiction.3 5 The outer bounds of a court's personal
jurisdiction are a constitutional limit; further statutory limita-
tions can exist inside these bounds.3 6 The constitutional limi-
tations on personal jurisdiction stem from the Due Process
Clause37 and are based on international law, sovereignty, and
fairness.3 8 In the seminal Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court gave
"the territorial concept constitutional approval."4 0 The Court
held that state courts had power over persons and property
within their borders, and presence was paramount. As time
passed, however, strict territoriality became inadequate as so-
ciety became more mobile and interconnected, lessening the
importance of state boundaries as goods and services travelled
nationally. In response, the Court added the concept of rea-
sonableness to personal jurisdiction, or at least to what would
become specific jurisdiction; the Court asked whether it was
"reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of
fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state"4 ' court to
hear a case. Over time, the Supreme Court expanded and nar-
rowed the contours of personal jurisdiction to ensure coexten-
sion with the limits of the Due Process Clause.4 2
35 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 3.1 (5th ed. 2015). Personal jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction are inter-
changeable terms; the Second Restatement of Judgments uses the term territorial
jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 4-10 (1982).
36 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 35, § 3.1.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
38 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23, 729 (1877); KEVIN M. CLERMONT,
PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 207-08 (3d ed. 2012); Earl M. Martz, Sovereign
Authority, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction The Case for the Doctrine of Tran-
sient Jurisdiction, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 671, 693 (1988) ("The Court's approach [to
general jurisdiction] is based on a subtle interaction between concepts of sover-
eignty and fairness."); Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty Inter-
est in Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 774 (2016) ("Because the
contours of the individual right protected by Due Process were wholly defined by
the power of the state, sovereignty occupied center stage under the Pennoyer
framework.").
39 95 U.S. at 714.
40 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 35, § 3.3.
41 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
42 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. While the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause governs state courts' personal jurisdic-
tion, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause governs federal courts' personal
jurisdiction. See Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue
for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 427-28 (1981).
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Of course, the introduction of reasonableness into per-
sonal jurisdiction made courts' determinations more complex
than they had been under a simple territoriality inquiry. The
Court clarified by developing a personal jurisdiction taxonomy
split into two categories: specific and general jurisdiction.43
The split traces back to Intemational Shoe Co. v. Washington;44
prior to International Shoe, exercise of personal jurisdiction
looked similar to how general jurisdiction operates today.4 5
In Intemational Shoe, decided in 1945, the Court put forth
the fundamental minimum contacts test4 6 and delineated the
boundary of personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant.4 7
Chief Justice Stone wrote that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personan, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."48
One way to understand the ruling in International Shoe is that
personal jurisdiction is proper against any defendant whose
contacts with a state are sufficient to logically conclude that
the defendant has benefitted from the laws of that state-the
strict territoriality of Pennoyer was no longer a workable per-
sonal jurisdiction doctrine in the face of the modem economy
because strict territoriality no longer comported with fairness.
To be clear, the Intemational Shoe opinion did not actually
reference the modern economy in its reasoning. It did, how-
ever, make the implication when discussing the importance of
presence. The Court stated that a presence inquiry "beg[s] the
question to be decided" in a personal jurisdiction inquiry be-
cause "'presence' [is] used merely to symbolize those activities
of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will
deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process."49
43 While I will treat specific and general jurisdiction as two distinct categories
for the purposes of this Note, some scholars argue that general and specific
jurisdiction are simply two sides of the same coin. CLERMONT, supra note 38, at
221 ("In this way, the development ofjurisdiction based on state-directed acts has
brought into the open the absence of any clear distinction between specific and
general jurisdiction-they just comprise the rules for the two ends of the unrelat-
edness continuum.").
44 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
45 See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV.
610, 614-15 (1988).
46 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
47 Id. at 317-19.
48 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
49 Id. at 316-17.
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As corporations evolved with the modern economy, logically
their physical presence might not expand while the types of
contacts cognizable in 1945 certainly would. The inquiry is not
"mechanical or quantitative."5 0 It is not whether a corpora-
tion's activities are "a little more or a little less." 5 1 Instead, the
test inquires about the "quality and nature" of the contacts
while also considering the importance of "the fair and orderly
administration of the laws." 5 2
Two decades after International Shoe, preeminent civil pro-
cedure scholars Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman
argued that traditional personal jurisdiction analysis was still
mired in reliance on antiquated ideas such as territoriality-
new modes of analysis and taxonomy were necessary, in their
opinion, to modernize personal jurisdiction.5 3 To that end, von
Mehren and Trautman used Court precedent and contempo-
rary legal thinking to crystallize the difference between general
and specific jurisdiction as we know it today. General jurisdic-
tion is exercised over "any kind of controversy when jurisdic-
tion is based on relationships, direct or indirect, between the
forum and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be
affected," whereas specific jurisdiction is exercised when "affili-
ations between the forum and the underlying contro-
versy ... support only the power to adjudicate with respect to
issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy
that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate."5" The Court grap-
pled implicitly with these concepts for two decades before ex-
plicitly recognizing them in Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.55 Eventually, the distinct bifurcation of
personal jurisdiction into general and specific went from aca-
demic suggestion to accepted personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence; in fact, Justice Ginsburg explicitly cited von Mehren
and Trautman in both Goodyea5 6 and Daimler.57
Today, a claim wholly unrelated to a corporation's in-state
activity can be brought against a corporation if the corporation
maintains "continuous corporate operations within a state
50 Id at 319.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1121 ("Old practices and con-
cepts have become less significant and less understandable . . .
54 Id. at 1136.
55 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1067.5.
56 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 923
(2011) (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1136).
57 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127-28 (2014) (citing von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 2, at 1164).
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[that are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit"
(general jurisdiction),5 8 or a claim can be brought based only
on "single or occasional acts" as long as the claim has a certain
quantum of relatedness to the acts (specific jurisdiction).5 9 Af-
ter International Shoe, the Court continued to refine specific
jurisdiction6 0 but, until recently, only issued two opinions on
general jurisdiction: Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co. 6 1 and Helicopteros.6 2 The Court's decision in Perkins would
thus figure prominently in Justice Ginsburg's analysis of mod-
em general jurisdiction in Daimler and lies at the heart of the
debate discussed below between Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor about the current and future viability of general
jurisdiction.
B. Doing Business: General Jurisdiction Before Goodyear
and Daimler
The dearth of Supreme Court opinions about general juris-
diction naturally left the subject open for some degree of inter-
pretation, and the general consensus among judges and
academics before Daimler was that "doing business" jurisdic-
tion remained a proper basis for general jurisdiction. After all,
"what later was referred to as 'general jurisdiction' was the
basis on which all jurisdiction was justified."6 3 Doing business
jurisdiction developed as a logical outgrowth of two preceding
58 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). Importantly, Jus-
tice Ginsburg notes that general jurisdiction requires more than "continuous and
systematic" contacts-the key inquiry is whether the contacts are so substantial
as to allow the logical conclusion that the corporation is at home in the state. See
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127-128.
59 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318-19.
60 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116
(1987) (providing two complex, competing theories for a stream-of-commerce
analysis of specific jurisdiction, evidencing the Court's desire to delicately shape
the contours of the doctrine); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
474-75 (1985) (refining the "purposeful availment" analysis of specific jurisdic-
tion); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773-74 (1984) (holding that
continuous and deliberate distribution of a publication in a state is sufficient to
establish specific jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297, 299 (1980) (holding that the mere foreseeability that a product
would enter the forum state and cause injury in that state is not sufficient to
establish specific jurisdiction).
61 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
62 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Von Mehren and Trautman correctly predicted that
specific jurisdiction would become more common and therefore more important
than general jurisdiction, writing that "specific jurisdiction will come into sharper
relief and form a considerably more significant part of the scene." Von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 2, at 1164.
63 See Barrett v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 390 P.3d 1031, 1042 (Or. 2017) (Wal-
ters, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Twitchell, supra note 45, at 614-15).
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theories of personal jurisdiction over corporations: presence
and consent." Before Pennoyer, corporations were only sub-
ject to suit in the state in which they were incorporated. 6 5 After
Pennoyer, which grounded personal jurisdiction in a state's
territory, courts needed a workable method to determine
whether a corporation was, hypothetically, physically present
within a state exclusive of its state of incorporation. 6 6 Doing
business jurisdiction satisfied this need. The test dictated that
"a . . . corporation should be [subject to general jurisdiction]
only if it was doing enough business within the state to justify
the inference that it was present there."6 7 If a court found that
a corporation's activities in a state passed a certain absolute
threshold of contacts, then the corporation was subject to the
general jurisdiction of that state's courts and thus could be
sued on any cause of action.68 Examples of corporate activity
which may have constituted doing business included soliciting
business from a local office, maintaining distributors in a state,
and employing agents who wielded the power to act on behalf of
a corporation.6 9 Until Goodyear and Daimler, this absolute
threshold contacts test meant that a corporation could theoret-
ically be subject to general jurisdiction in however many states
the corporation maintained a certain level of contacts.
Doing business jurisdiction, however, does not survive to-
day, per the most common readings of Goodyear and
Daimler70 it is, nevertheless, critically important conceptually
as a logical antecedent to modem general jurisdiction jurispru-
dence. In fact, doing business jurisdiction has been out of
favor with the Supreme Court for at least half a century; in
1957, Justice Black wrote that "[in a continuing process of
evolution this Court accepted and then abandoned 'consent,'
'doing business,' and 'presence' as the standard for measuring
64 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 35, § 3.7.
65 See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 520 (1839)
(containing dicta stating that "a corporation can have no legal existence out of the
boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created... . It must dwell in the place
of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.").
66 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 35 § 3.7.
67 Id.; see also 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1069.2 ("Traditionally, a
finding that a defendant was 'doing business' in the forum state was equivalent to
the pre-International Shoe fiction of finding a defendant corporation 'present' in
the forum."). Note the similarity between this definition of personal jurisdiction
over corporations, the definition provided above from International Shoe, and
Justice Ginsburg's refinement in Goodyear and Daimler, below. See supra note
58 and accompanying text.
68 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1069.2.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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the extent of state judicial power over such corporations."7 1
Professor Kevin M. Clermont argued that the doing business
brand of general jurisdiction "arose to provide appropriate ju-
risdiction when specific jurisdiction was not yet fully availa-
ble."7 2  In conjunction with von Mehren and Trautman's
assertion that specific jurisdiction would become the dominant
form of personal jurisdiction,73 reading Goodyear and Daimler
as the death knells of doing business jurisdiction makes sense.
C. Goodyear and Daimler: Specific Jurisdiction Comes of
Age and General Jurisdiction Limited to Two (or
Three) Circumstances.
When the Court returned from its twenty-year personal
jurisdiction hiatus in 2011, first with Goodyear and then with
Daimler, the Court laid the doing business test to rest and
replaced it with the more narrow "at home" test for general
jurisdiction.7 4 According to Justice Ginsburg, author of both
opinions, general jurisdiction only lies when a corporation is
"essentially at home in the forum State." 75 In practice, this
means that general jurisdiction only lies when the forum state
is the corporation's state of incorporation or the corporation's
principal place of business. These two bases constitute the
paradigmatic examples for general jurisdiction, serving as
proxies for an individual's domicile (hypothetical presence).7 6
Existing outside these paradigmatic examples is the excep-
tional case, when "a corporation's operations in a forum other
than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of busi-
71 McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
72 CLERMONT, supra note 38, at 221 ("Today, courts resort to [general jurisdic-
tion], albeit usually inappropriately, only when all appropriate bases of personal
jurisdiction fail to reach the defendant.").
73 Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1164. The idea that specific
jurisdiction has expanded and effectively displaced any utility general jurisdiction
once had is the dominant opinion of the contemporary Supreme Court. See
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 925 (2011)
("[Slpecific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modem jurisdiction theory,
while general jurisdiction plays a reduced role." (quoting Twitchell, supra note 45,
at 628)); Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts:
General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101,
125 (2015) ("[Justice Ginsburg's] survey suggests that specific jurisdiction, liber-
ated from traditional limits, has expanded to fill most of the jurisdictional gaps
created by Pennoyer's restrictions. In contrast, general jurisdiction remains cap-
tive in Pennoyer's corral, an archaic doctrine rarely useful in the modem world.").
74 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121-22 (2014) (citing Goodyear, 564
U.S. at 919).
75 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
76 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136-37.
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ness may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render
the corporation at home in that State."7 7
In adopting this simplified understanding of general juris-
diction, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the law was re-
flecting von Mehren and Trautman's prophecy that specific
jurisdiction would come to dominate personal jurisdiction.7 8
In fact, Justice Ginsburg stated that the at home test for gen-
eral jurisdiction was definitively not "synonymous with 'doing
business' tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in
the United States,"79 ensuring that lower courts were aware of
the sea change.8 0 This is important because if modem general
jurisdiction followed traditional doing business jurisdiction,
then national corporations that have contacts in each state
would likely be subject to suit in each state.8 ' Daimler ex-
pressly forbids this result.8 2
D. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor Split Over General
Jurisdiction
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor disagree on
whether Daimler should signal the formal demise of the doing
business test. Justice Ginsburg authored the majority opinion
in Goodyear and Daimler Justice Sotomayor joined the (unani-
mous) majority in Goodyear but wrote a separate concurrence
77 Id. at 139 n. 19; see also id. at 130 n.8 (citing one of the very few examples
of such general jurisdiction, at least according to Justice Ginsburg, Perkins v.
Benguet ConsoL Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)).
78 Id. at 139-40 n.20.
79 Id.
80 See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 629 (2d Cir. 2016)
("[The Court's 2011 decision in Goodyear seemed to have left open the possibility
that contacts of substance, deliberately undertaken and of some duration, could
place a corporation 'at home' in many locations. But Daimler, decided in 2014,
considerably altered the analytic landscape for general jurisdiction and left little
room for these arguments."); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d
Cir. 2014) (holding that Daimler foreclosed any argument under the doing busi-
ness test); Reich v. Lopez, 38 F. Supp. 3d 436, 454-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("The
Supreme Court's recent decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman has brought uncer-
tainty to application of New York's 'doing business' rule. As a result, it is unclear
whether existing New York general jurisdiction jurisprudence remains via-
ble."), affd, 858 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2017).
81 See Feder, supra note 23, at 680 ("Nonetheless, Goodyear's limitation of
general jurisdiction to the state or states in which the corporation is at home
seems inconsistent with the far more expansive notion embodied by the doing
business standard-that general jurisdiction is available in any state in which the
defendant has regular and consistent commercial activities." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
82 See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139-40 n.20 (stating that a corporation "that
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them").
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in Daimler.83 The key disagreement is whether general juris-
diction should be static, keyed to the paradigmatic examples,
or dynamic, keyed to reasonableness.
In an Article following Goodyear and anticipating Daimler,
Howard M. Erichson described the situation that led to the
schism.8 4 To Erichson, general jurisdiction's exercise had be-
come too broad in application as doing business matured, and
courts had consequently fashioned new, restrictive tools in re-
sponse to "an overenthusiastic embrace of 'doing business' ju-
risdiction."8 5 Erichson argued that the correct response would
be to restrict general jurisdiction to a pure domicile analogy,
just as Justice Ginsburg would in Daimler.86 His article, how-
ever, also demonstrated why Justice Sotomayor would con-
sider Daimler's doctrinal solution an overcorrection: Erichson
advocated for an expansive definition of principal place of busi-
ness in the context of general jurisdiction, including the possi-
bility of multiple states, contacts tests, and nerve center
tests8 7 -Justice Ginsburg's decision in Daimler is not so
forgiving.
In Daimler, the Court held that general jurisdiction, unlike
specific jurisdiction, had not been "cut loose from Pennoyer's
sway," arguably restricting modem general jurisdiction to a
territorial, sovereignty-based rationale from nearly 150 years
prior.8 8 The product of Justice Ginsburg's opinion is likely a
curtailment of general jurisdiction to two states per corpora-
tion: the state of incorporation and the principal place of busi-
ness. Justice Ginsburg clarified a comparative contacts
analysis, in which a corporation can only be regarded to be at
home in a state if their contacts with that state represent a
large proportion of their contacts in total. The test seems to
require a large plurality or a majority of a corporation's con-
tacts to occur in a state to render a corporation at home in that
83 Justice Sotomayor was the only justice to write separately in either opin-
ion. See id. at 119; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 915 (2011).
84 Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State Test for General Personal Jurisdic-
tion, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 81, 90 (2013).
85 Id. at 93. Of note, one tool explicitly rejected by Erichson was the importa-
tion of specific jurisdiction's reasonableness prong into general jurisdiction doc-
trine to create a similar two-step analysis. Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 132-33 (2014) (citing Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)). Again reiterating the notion that vonMehren and Traut-
man were correct in asserting that general jurisdiction would wane in importance,
Justice Ginsburg wrote that "general jurisdiction has come to occupy a less domi-
nant place in the contemporary scheme." Id. at 133.
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state. Therefore, the type of national corporations to which we
have become accustomed will hardly, if ever, centralize their
contacts in a state, other than their state of incorporation and
principal place of business, to such a degree that the courts
consider them a native of that state.8 9 This seems to be Justice
Ginsburg's desired result: "A corporation that operates in many
places can scarcely be deemed to be at home in all of them."9 0
Notably, Justice Ginsburg does not foreclose the possibility
that a corporation may be deemed to be at home in a state
outside its two paradigmatic homes, and her discussion of Per-
kins as an example of the elusive exceptional case of general
jurisdiction is an entry point into the fundamental differences
between Justices Ginsburg's and Sotomayor's differing views of
modem general jurisdiction. First, it is important to remember
that Perkins is often cited as the "roots of the contemporary
doctrine of 'general jurisdiction.'"9 1 Justice Ginsburg relied
heavily upon Perkins in Dainler, writing "[The Court's] 1952
decision in Perkins v. Benguet ConsoL Mining Co. remains the
textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised
over a foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the
forum." 9 2 Later in the opinion Justice Ginsburg revisits Per-
kins and states that Perkins is the fundamental example of the
"exceptional case," where a corporation is at home in a state
that is neither its state of incorporation nor its principal place
of business.9 3 Thus, Perkins is both a textbook case of general
jurisdiction (at least over foreign, nonconsenting corporations)
and the example of the exceptional case-implying that general
jurisdiction over a nonconsenting foreign corporation is a
rarity.
A brief review of the facts in Perkins is necessary. In Per-
kins, the Court held that a Philippine corporation was subject
to general jurisdiction in Ohio despite the claim's complete un-
relatedness to the corporation's contacts with Ohio-in fact,
the corporation in question was only in Ohio at all because of
89 Id. at 143-44.
90 Id. at 140 n.20.
91 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1067.5.
92 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 129 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 927-28 (2011)).
93 Id. at 139 n. 19. These two nominations for textbook examples of different
branches of general jurisdiction are in concert with each other because logically a
foreign corporation is not incorporated in and does not have a principal place of
business in any state. Accordingly, foreign corporations would likely mightily
struggle to meet Daimler's principal place of business test, confined only to the
exceptional case.
2019] 1101
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
war-time conditions in the Philippines.9 4 The mining opera-
tions of the corporation in the Philippines had ceased due to
World War II and the corporation's president was performing
what little corporate activity was ongoing from an office in
Ohio.9 5 Thus, under Justice Ginsburg's comparative contacts
test announced in Daimler, general jurisdiction would be ap-
propriate because nearly all of the corporation's contacts, na-
tionwide-in fact, worldwide-took place in Ohio.
Proportionally, Ohio was the corporation's home.9 6
Justice Sotomayor, writing for herself only, argued that
general jurisdiction should not overcorrect, but should rather
embrace the adoption of a reasonableness prong in general
jurisdiction and maintain an absolute threshold for a contacts
test. She considered Justice Ginsburg's opinion to essentially
hold that contemporary multinational corporations are "too big
for general jurisdiction" by inventing the comparative contacts
test.9 7 No multinational (or national) corporation, in the Jus-
tice's opinion, would ever have enough contacts in any one
state, comparatively, to hurdle the jurisdictional bar; thus,
Daimler would essentially immunize all large corporations from
general jurisdiction outside the paradigms.
Justice Sotomayor grappled with Justice Ginsburg's treat-
ment of Perkins in order to prove her point. Justice Sotomayor
noted that, in Perkins, the Court focused on facts like the cor-
poration's maintenance of an office, supervision of properties,
and directors' meetings.9 8 Those are all traditional factors in a
doing business contacts inquiry. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor
argued, the Court in Perkins never compared contacts inside
Ohio with those outside Ohio, ignoring their proportionality to
94 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
95 Id.
96 Critically, however, it is unclear whether Justice Ginsburg was ascribing
her comparative contacts test to a principal place of business inquiry or an excep-
tional case inquiry. This is a critical doctrinal omission because it opens the door
for courts to adopt the nerve center test for principal place of business in general
jurisdiction and adopt Daimler's comparative contacts test for the exceptional
case inquiry. As discussed below, infra Part II, there are also clues that Justice
Ginsburg interprets Perkins' exercise of general jurisdiction to rest on the fact that
Ohio was the Philippine corporation's nerve center. See Dainler, 130 n.8 ("All of
[defendant]'s activities were directed by the company's president from within
Ohio."); id. at 157 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("The majority does not dispute that
a State can exercise general jurisdiction where a corporate defendant has its
corporate headquarters, and hence its principal place of business within the
State. Cf. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 93 ...
97 1I at 143.
98 Id. at 150 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48).
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total corporate activity.9 9 Finally, Justice Sotomayor wrote, the
Court in Perkins literally reasoned that the corporation's con-
tacts to Ohio were a "limited . .. part of its general business."10 0
As such, Justice Sotomayor's logic concluded, Perkins must
have employed an absolute contacts test rather than a compar-
ative one.
Justice Sotomayor concurred in Daimler because she
would have held the defendant's contacts to be sufficient for
general jurisdiction. Relying on analogous precedent in the
Court's specific jurisdiction jurisprudence such as Asahi,'0
Justice Sotomayor would have held that California had the
power to hale Daimler into court but that it would have been
unreasonable to do so. 102 Rather than leaving general jurisdic-
tion tethered to Pennoyer and letting it fade into irrelevancy,
Justice Sotomayor argued that general jurisdiction should be
brought into modernity by applying the same reasonableness
prong currently used for specific jurisdiction inquiries. 0 3
Daimler, however, likely disposed of the reasonableness
prong when a corporation is "at home." Despite Justice
Sotomayor's note that "[tihe Courts of Appeals have uniformly
held that the reasonableness prong does in fact apply in the
general jurisdiction context," 0 4 Justice Ginsburg wrote that
"[wihen a corporation is genuinely at home in the forum State,
however, any second-step [reasonableness] inquiry would be
superfluous." 0 5 If being "genuinely at home" encompasses
the two "essentially at home" general jurisdiction categories
(incorporation, principal place of business) and the exceptional
case, then this statement ends the argument that general juris-
diction has a reasonableness prong. 0 6
99 Id.
100 Id. (quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438).
101 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
102 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 145 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("As a result, I would
decide this case under the reasonableness prong without foreclosing future con-
sideration of whether that prong should be limited to the specific jurisdiction
context."). Factors that bear on whether suit is reasonable include potential
burdens to the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the interests of
foreign sovereigns, among others. Id.
103 Id. at 144-45.
104 Id. at 144 n.1.
105 Id. at 140 n.20 (majority opinion).
106 See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 630 (2d Cir. 2016). At
the risk of hair-splitting, there is still a potential argument to make. Justice
Ginsburg's statement-that a reasonableness inquiry would be superfluous if a
corporation was already held to be at home-could apply only to the two paradig-
matic bases for general jurisdiction, leaving a reasonableness inquiry applicable
to questions of the exceptional case.
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If the doing business test had lurched too far to one side
and Daimler lurched back the other way, then Justice
Sotomayor's concurrence would represent a middle ground in
which reasonableness provided flexibility. Similar to the ma-
jority's opinion, however, it is unclear how Justice Sotomayor
would categorize her absolute contacts and reasonableness
test, whether they determine the principal place of business
test or the exceptional case. Certainly, at least, Justice
Sotomayor argued that general jurisdiction doctrine should al-
low exercise in more than two states: "[The majority in Dainler]
never explains why the State should lose [general jurisdiction]
when, as is increasingly common, a corporation 'divide[s] [its]
command and coordinating functions among officers who work
in several different locations."' 1 0 7 The additional states could
then fall into multiple principal places of business or multiple
exceptional cases.
In essence, Justice Sotomayor argued that holding a corpo-
ration to be at home in more than two states is an "inevitable
consequence of the rule of due process we set forth [in Intema-
tional Shoe]."10 8 Otherwise, Justice Sotomayor wrote, "a larger
company will often be immunized from general jurisdiction in a
State on account of its extensive contacts outside the forum,"
and "the ultimate effect of the majority's approach will be to
shift the risk of loss from multinational corporations to the
individuals harmed by their actions."109 To immunize corpora-
tions from suit under general jurisdiction ultimately harms
consumers because meritorious claims will fail to get through
the courthouse door. "What has changed since Interrational
Shoe is not the due process principle of fundamental fairness
but rather the nature of the global economy."' 10
II
BRISTOL-MYERS SQuiBB's RESTRICTION OF SPECIFIC
JURISDICTION CREATES NEW IMPORTANCE
FOR GENERAL JURISDICTION
The final piece of recent personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence arrived in the summer of 2017 with the Court's decision
in Bristol-Myers Squibb.111 In that case, the Court, by an eight-
107 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 157 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Hertz Corp.
v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95-96 (2010)).
108 Ic. at 155.
109 Ic. at 158-59.
110 Id. at 155-56.
111 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). Bris-
tol-Myers Squibb is not the only recent case to narrow specific jurisdiction. As
1 104 [Vol. 104:1085
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to-one margin,11 2 restricted specific jurisdiction by holding
that California state courts could not exercise specific jurisdic-
tion over a corporate defendant with regard to claims of nonres-
idents unrelated to the forum.' 1 3 To many, Bristol-Myers
Squibb represents the Court's decision to "cast aside the notion
that globalization could justify 50-state forum shopping."'14
Bristol-Myers Squibb illustrates just how restrictive per-
sonal jurisdiction jurisprudence has become. First, before
Goodyear and Daimler, the California state court would have
almost certainly had general jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers
Squibb by virtue of the volume of its sales in California-these
contacts would have likely met the criteria for traditional doing
business jurisdiction." 5 In fact, the California state court in
Bristol-Myers Squibb originally held that Bristol-Myers Squibb
was subject to general jurisdiction in California-only after the
issuance of Daimler did the court hold that Bristol-Myers
Squibb was not subject to general jurisdiction and was instead
subject to specific jurisdiction. 116 Second, before Bristol-Myers
Squibb, many would have expected the state court to have spe-
cific jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb." 7
Erwin Chemerinsky noted, the Court in the 2014 case Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S.
277 (2014), authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, held that the minimum con-
tacts inquiry for specific jurisdiction related only to direct contacts with the state
in question, not contacts with citizens thereof. Effectively, only a defendant's, not
a plaintiffs, contacts are taken into consideration. Erwin Chemerinsky, SCOTUS
Takes on When State Courts Can Assert Jurisdiction over Out-of-State Parties, ABA
JOURNAL (Apr. 25, 2017, 6:54 AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/
clarifying-personaljurisdiction chemerinsky_supreme court/ [https://perma
.cc/8PFB-9YZX]. For a discussion of the dangers of limiting both specific and
personal jurisdiction simultaneously, see Richard D. Freer, Some Specific Con-
cerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEv. L.J. 1161, 1178-80 (2015).
112 Justice Sotomayor, as in Daimler, was the only justice not to join the
majority opinion. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
I"3 Bradt & Rave, supra note 30, at 1279-83.
114 Dean & Cronin, supra note 9 at 23. Nevertheless, some courts continue to
follow earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding specific jurisdiction (and
particularly the stream of commerce doctrine). See id.
115 See Erichson, supra note 84, at 90 (stating, while answering a hypothetical
similar to Bristol-Myers Squibb, "[pirior to 2011, many courts and commentators
would have said [the court has general jurisdiction]. Based on [a corporation's]
continuous and systematic contacts, many would have said that [the state] courts
could assert general jurisdiction even though the company is headquartered and
incorporated [elsewhere].").
116 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 424
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014), review granted and opinion superseded sub norn. Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. S.C., 337 P.3d 1158 (Cal. 2014), and affd, 1 Cal. 5th 783
(2016), rev'd sub nom. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct.
1773 (2017).
117 See Bradt & Rave, supra note 30, at 1271-1273.
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Instead, the Court held that neither applied. Naturally, the
recent restriction of specific jurisdiction over corporations will
lead plaintiffs to pursue new avenues of personal jurisdiction.
General jurisdiction seems like the next battlefield because
plaintiffs can try to expand general jurisdiction's application by
stretching the exceptional case while corporations can try to
narrow general jurisdiction by arguing that the Hertz nerve
center test applies to general jurisdiction and argue that
Daimler effectively forecloses the exceptional case for good.
Early returns indicate that the expansion of the exceptional
case is generally a losing argument.11 8
III
GENERAL JURISDICTION AFTER DAIMLER: THE LOWER COURTS HAVE
OFTEN APPLIED THE NERVE CENTER TEST AND HAVE LAID THE
GROUNDWORK FOR THE CONTACTS PLUS TEST
A. The Nerve Center Test
Whether the nerve center test applies to general jurisdic-
tion matters because corporations will be able to manipulate
their nerve centers more easily than a principal place of busi-
ness test based on either absolute or comparative contacts. As
Cornett and Hoffheimer predicted, 11 9 corporations have al-
ready begun to advocate for the nerve center test in order to
locate themselves outside courts' reaches. 1 2 0 For example, the
defendants in MG Design Associates, Corp. v. CoStar Realty
Information, Inc. asserted that Illinois did not have general ju-
risdiction over them because, while their "primary office" is in
Illinois, their nerve center is in Washington, D.C. 1 2 1 The court
noted that "[the defendants] point to the Supreme Court's nerve
center test used to establish diversity jurisdiction," but did not
clearly accept or reject this argument.1 2 2 Other courts note
that plaintiffs are trying to simply ignore Daimler, demonstrat-
ing plaintiffs' dislike of the doctrinal change and its uneven
118 See, e.g., Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 629 (2d Cir.
2016) (suggesting that contacts are irrelevant to whether a case is "exceptional"
and effectively reducing Perkins to its facts).
119 See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
120 See, e.g., Cucuz v. Rosta Int'l Ltd., No. 2:15-cv-10479, 2017 WL 2213572,
at *5-6 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2017) (stating that defendant argued that "the Su-
preme Court has rejected the 'business activities' test for determining a corpora-
tions principal place of business in favor of the 'nerve center' test" before applying
the nerve center test to general jurisdiction).
121 267 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
122 IL
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effect on litigants.1 2 3 Lower courts are already deciding cases
in which corporate defendants are using Hertz's nerve center
test as a shield against general jurisdiction and in which
Dainler's restriction of general jurisdiction to two states is lim-
iting in practice.1 2 4
A survey of recent case law shows that lower courts are
split on this issue on a number of axes. Before Goodyear and
Daimler, general jurisdiction was an absolute, threshold con-
tacts test, asking whether a corporation's activities were so
"continuous and systematic" as to "approximate physical pres-
ence."' 25 After Daimler, lower courts have recognized that cor-
porations are effectively only subject to general jurisdiction in
their state of incorporation and their principal place of busi-
ness.1 26 The role of contacts is unclear. On the one hand,
some courts have explicitly embraced the nerve center test for
principal place of business, holding contacts irrelevant for a
general jurisdiction inquiry.1 2 7 On the other hand, some
courts continue to assess contacts, treating general jurisdic-
tion's principal place of business as Justice Ginsburg's com-
parative contacts test.1 28 Complicating this genre of general
jurisdiction is the question whether the contacts inquiry deter-
mines the sole principal place of business, determines a possi-
123 Hood v. Ascent Med. Corp., No. 13cv0628 (RWS) (DF), 2016 WL 1366920,
at *9 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016) ("Incredibly, Plaintiffs supplemental submis-
sion on the issue of personal jurisdiction does not cite Daimler or Goodyear (or
even a single case from this Circuit issued after those decisions), let alone address
how those cases should impact this Court's jurisdictional analysis."), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 13 Civ. 628 (RWS), 2016 WL 3453656 (S.D.N.Y.
June 20, 2016), affd, 691 F. App'x 8 (2d Cir. 2017).
124 See McGill v. Conwed Corp., No. 17-01047 (SRN/HB), 2017 WL 4534827,
at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 10, 2017) ("Plaintiffs also accuse Conwed historically of
identifying whatever location is most beneficial to the corporation in a given case
as its principal place of business." (emphasis added)).
125 Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2000), holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et
L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
126 See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 629 (2d Cir. 2016)
("[The Court's 2011 decision in Goodyear seemed to have left open the possibility
that contacts of substance, deliberately undertaken and of some duration, could
place a corporation 'at home' in many locations. But Daimler, decided in 2014,
considerably altered the analytic landscape for general jurisdiction and left little
room for these arguments.").
127 See id.
128 See infra Part IV. Some courts have instead sidestepped the issue entirely
because there are a large number of cases in which the nerve center test and any
type of contacts test would have the same result. See, e.g., Livnat v. Palestinian
Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("The appellants do not argue that the
Palestinian Authority may be 'fairly regarded as at home' in the United States, and
for good reason. Its headquarters, officials, and primary activities are all in the
West Bank.").
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ble additional principal place of business (in addition to a nerve
center), or determines whether a case falls into the exceptional
case.
Opinions in which federal district courts explicitly apply
the nerve center test for general jurisdiction, with explicit refer-
ence to Hertz, are many.1 29 This seems to be the dominant
129 See, e.g., Fox v. Michael Berenis, Bootaholics, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-2066-SI,
2018 WL 6313003, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 3, 2018); Hegemann v. M & M Am., Inc., No.
2:18-CV-00064, 2018 WL 4502181, at *3 (D. Vt. Sept. 20, 2018); Bd. of Trustees
of Glazing Health & Welfare Fund v. Z-Glass, Inc., No. 217-CV-01638-JAD-NJK,
2018 WL 4053320, at *5 n.37 (D. Nev. Aug. 24, 2018) (explicitly applying Hertz to
general jurisdiction); Storms v. Haugland Energy Grp., LLC, No. 18-CV-80334,
2018 WL 4347603, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2018), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 18-CV-80334-BB, 2018 WL 4347604 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2018); Ross
v. Jenkins, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1162 n.3 (D. Kan. 2018), motion for relieffrom
judgment denied, No. 17-2547-DDC-TJJ, 2018 WL 4749375 (D. Kan. Oct. 2,
2018); Retail Pipeline, LLC v. JDA Software Grp., No. 2:17-cv-00067, 2018 WL
1621508, at *9 (D. Vt. Mar. 30, 2018); Thunderbird Resorts, Inc. v. Zimmer, No.
15CV1304-JAH (BGS), 2018 WL 1542044, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2018); Live
Face on Web, LLC v. Archevos Corp., No. 17-CV-1487-WQH-NLS, 2018 WL
1035209, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2018) (finding that the plaintiff did not estab-
lish that the defendant "direct[s], control[s], and coordinate[s]" its operations from
California); Portillo v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. ED CV 17-01497-AB (JCx),
2018 WL 637386, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018); McGill v. Conwed Corp., No. 17-
01047 (SRN/HB), 2017 WL 4534827, at *4, *9 (D. Minn. Oct. 10, 2017) (explain-
ing that Hertz can be marshaled for or against general jurisdiction: "Here, al-
though both parties apply Hertz, they argue for different results."); Nespresso
USA, Inc. v. Ethical Coffee Co. SA, 263 F. Supp. 3d 498, 503 (D. Del. 2017);
Gallagher v. Roberts, No. 3:16-cv-01437-BEN-DHB, 2017 WL 1365792, at *3
(S.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2017); Int'l Union v. Consol Energy, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 3d 755,
761 (S.D.W. Va. 2017); Maxchief Investments Ltd. v. Plastic Dev. Grp., LLC, No.
3:16-CV-63, 2016 WL 7209553, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2016); Rullan v.
Goden, No. CCB-12-2412, 2016 WL 1159112, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 24, 2016); Hood
v. Ascent Med. Corp., No. 13cv0628 (RWS) (DF), 2016 WL 1366920, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016), (finding that the fact that the defendant's former CEO
and Vice President worked out of Minneapolis suggested that Minnesota was the
defendant's nerve center), report and recommendation adopted, No. 13 Civ. 628
(RWS), 2016 WL 3453656 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2016), affd, 691 F. App'x 8 (2d Cir.
2017); Duncanson v. Wine & Canvas Dev., LLC, No. 614-CV-704-Orl-40KRS,
2015 WL 12838359, at *22 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 2015); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elec-
trolux Home Prod., Inc., No. 1:14 CV 329, 2014 WL 3615382, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Ohio
July 18, 2014); Flynn v. Hovensa, LLC, No. 3:14-43, 2014 WL 3375238, at *2
(W.D. Pa. July 3, 2014); Google Inc. v. Rockstar Consortium U.S. LP, No. C 13-
5933 CW, 2014 WL 1571807, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014); In re Pursuit
Capital Mgmt., LLC, 595 B.R. 631, 648-49 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 2, 2018) ("While it
is not altogether clear that the 'nerve center' standard enunciated in Hertz should
be extended to the Rule 12(b)(2) context, because Defendants argued this stan-
dard and Plaintiffs did not take issue with that suggestion, I will apply it here.").
But cf. Louis Dreyfus Co. Freight Asia Pte. Ltd. v. Uttam Galva Steels Ltd., No. 17-
CV-2476 (JSR), 2017 WL 5126067, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2017) ("Indeed, in the
instant case, plaintiffs complaint does not, in fact, establish that UGNA's princi-
pal place of business is in New York. It only pleads that UGNA's 'principal execu-
tive office' is in New York-which is not the same thing."). Interestingly, the court
in Rullan v. Goden cites a Fourth Circuit case for their application of the nerve
center test even though the cited case only talks about the "principal place of
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approach. At least one state court of last resort has similarly
adopted Hertz's nerve center test for general jurisdiction's prin-
cipal place of business.13 0 Despite the lack of explicit guidance
on whether the nerve center test applies to general jurisdiction,
courts that apply the nerve center test to general jurisdiction
do so without much fanfare. For example, in a case decided
during the same year as Daimler, one court wrote simply: "A
corporate defendant is 'at home' where it is incorporated and
where it has its principal place of business. A corporation's
principal place of business is its 'nerve center.'"1 3 1 Another
simply stated, in a footnote referencing general jurisdiction
doctrine, "[a] corporation's 'principal place of business' has
been determined to be its 'nerve center'-the administrative
and/or operational headquarters that serves as the seat of con-
trol for the corporation."' 3 2
Other courts have continued to determine a corporation's
principal place of business, and thus whether a corporation is
at home for purposes of general jurisdiction, without any men-
tion of Hertz. 133 These courts' holdings, however, do not explic-
business" within the context of diversity jurisdiction. Hoschar v. Appalachian
Power Co., 739 F.3d 163, 174 (4th Cir. 2014).
130 See, e.g., State ex reL Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 48 (Mo.
2017), re'g denied (Apr. 4, 2017) ("The nature of Norfolk's activities in Missouri
are quite distinct from the 'nerve-center' of activities that the Supreme Court has
said might be sufficient to make a 'home' state." (citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559
U.S. 77, 92 (2010))).
131 Flynn, 2014 WL 3375238 at *2 (first citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opera-
tions, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011); then citing Hertz, 559 U.S. at
92-93).
132 Campbell v. Fast Retailing USA, Inc., No. 14-6752, 2015 WL 9302847, at
*2 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2015); see also Cucuz v. Rosta Int'l Ltd., No. 2:15-cv-
10479, 2017 WL 2213572, at *5-6 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2017) (explicitly applying
Hertz's nerve center test to general jurisdiction's principal place of business in-
quiry); McGill v. Conwed Corp., No. 17-01047 (SRN/HB), 2017 WL 4534827, at
*5, *9 (D. Minn. Oct. 10, 2017) (applying the nerve center test to a subject-matter
jurisdiction inquiry and then taking the same principal place of business as legal
fact for a general jurisdiction inquiry); Rock River Commc'ns, Inc. v. Universal
Music Grp., Inc., No. CV 08-635 CAS (AJWx), 2010 WL 11508360, at *5 n.3 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 5, 2010) (applying the nerve center test, holding the plaintiffs principal
place of business was the state in which the CEO lived and worked, where the vast
majority of plaintiffs business took place, and where the majority of plaintiffs
employees lived and worked).
133 See Hernandez v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 347 F. Supp. 3d 921, 965 (D.N.M.
2018) ("Accordingly, [defendant] does not have minimum contacts with New Mex-
ico via the general personal jurisdiction avenue."); Gallagher v. Roberts, No. 3:16-
cv-01437-BEN-DHB, 2017 WL 1365792, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2017) (implicitly
applying the nerve center test and holding that California does not have general
jurisdiction over a corporation with its place of incorporation and principal place
of business outside the state and that its contacts do not justify an expansion of
the "exceptional case"); Barnett v. Surefire Med., Inc., No. JFM- 17-1332, 2017 WL
4279497, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2017); In re Asbestos Litig., No. 17-00251-VAC-
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itly state that Hertz does not govern general jurisdiction's
principal place of business inquiry. Nonetheless, it seems that
these courts are continuing to apply a traditional, context-spe-
cific contacts test as modified by Dainler-a comparative con-
tacts test rather than an absolute contacts test.13 4 For
example, one recent opinion concerning general jurisdiction
neither cited Hertz nor discussed the term principal place of
business within the context of general jurisdiction.13 5 In that
case, the court employed Justice Ginsburg's comparative con-
tacts test: "[Defendant]'s nationwide sales, of which Maryland
contributes between 2% and 4%, would be insufficient to
render Maryland akin to a 'home state' for general jurisdiction
purposes."13 6
As such, this brand of general jurisdiction inquiry essen-
tially asks first about state incorporation and principal place of
business, and, if an easy answer does not emerge, then pro-
ceeds to a contacts test that looks a lot like a doing business
test but incorporating Justice Ginsburg's directive for compar-
ative contacts. The Southern District of New York recently
stated the standard simply:
[Because neither paradigmatic example applies,] the exercise
of general jurisdiction in this forum is constitutionally per-
missible only if AMC's contacts with the State of New York
were of such a nature that New York was essentially AMC's
home state. This standard requires a court to judge a corpo-
SRF, 2017 WL 4062249, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 14, 2017); Spratley v. F.C.A. U.S.
L.L.C., No. 3:17-CV-0062, 2017 WL 4023348, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017);
Lemon v. Kramer, No. 16-2025 (RC), 2017 WL 4060532, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 11,
2017); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prod., Inc., No. 1:14 CV 329, 2014 WL
3615382, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Ohio July 18, 2014).
134 Minholz v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 227 F. Supp. 3d 249, 262 (N.D.N.Y.
2016) (holding that the defendant's comparative contacts did not render the de-
fendant essentially at home, and then implying that the test for principal place of
business is the nerve center test: "Thus, the facts neither establish that Lockheed
Martin is 'essentially at home' in New York, nor provide a basis to conclude that
New York is Lockheed Martin's surrogate for its place of incorporation or head
office").
135 See Barnett, 2017 WL 4279497 at *2 ("'For an individual, the paradigm
forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly re-
garded as at home.' Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 924, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed.2d 796 (2011). In the context of a corpora-
tion, the paradigm bases for general jurisdiction are 'the place of incorporation
and principal place of business.' Daimler AG v. Bauman, - U.S. -, 134 S. Ct.
746, 759, 187 L. Ed.2d 624 (2014).").
136 Barnett, 2017 WL 4279497 at *2; see also DeGregorio v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.,
No. 17-3867, 2017 WL 6367894, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2017) (holding that the
corporate defendant was not subject to general jurisdiction by applying Daimler's
proportional contact test without mention of Hertz).
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ration's contacts with the forum state against all of its na-
tional and global activities, and to exercise general
jurisdiction only if a corporation's affiliation with the forum
state is so strong that the entity is "comparable to a domestic
enterprise in that State."13 7
It is important to note, however, that it not always clear if
the courts applying Justice Ginsburg's comparative contacts
test are assessing the corporations' contacts in order to deter-
mine if they are in the exceptional case of general jurisdiction
or if they are using the contacts inquiry to determine the (or a)
principal place of business. 1 3 8 With the opinions lacking ex-
plicit discussion, it is unknown whether the courts are adopt-
ing the logic of Hertz-that corporations have only one
principal place of business, a simple rule- 3 9-or adopting the
logic of Erichson, that a corporation can have multiple princi-
ple places of business in special circumstances, just as citizens
can be dual nationals. 140
Other courts indicate that the exceptional case is simply an
absolute quantum-of-contacts test.' 4 1 In this brand, Dailer
137 Hood v. Ascent Med. Corp., No. 13cv0628 (RWS) (DF), 2016 WL 1366920,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016) (citations omitted), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 13 Civ. 628 (RWS), 2016 WL 3453656 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2016),
affd, 691 F. App'x 8 (2d Cir. 2017).
138 See Barnett, 2017 WL 4279497 at *2; DeGregorio, 2017 WL 6367894 at *4;
Google Inc. v. Rockstar Consortium U.S. LP, No. C 13-5933 CW, 2014 WL
1571807, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014) (stating that the defendants "claim to
have principal places of business in Plano, Texas" before assessing the defend-
ants' contacts with California and concluding that defendants were not at home in
California without explicitly saying whether the inquiry was about principal place
of business or the exceptional case).
139 Infra note 197.
140 Erichson, supra note 84, at 86 ("Unlike the definition of principal place of
business under the diversity jurisdiction statute, there is no reason why general
jurisdiction cannot encompass multiple home states in special cases." (footnote
omitted)).
141 See Congdon v. Cheapcaribbean.com, Inc., No. 17 C 5502, 2017 WL
5069960, at *7 (N.D. III. Nov. 3, 2017) ("Accordingly, to show that this is an
exceptional case under Daimler, Plaintiffs must show that each of the Defendants'
affiliations with Illinois are so continuous and systematic as to render them es-
sentially at home in Illinois, which is more than the 'substantial, continuous, and
systematic course of business' that was once thought to suffice." (quoting Daimler,
571 U.S. at 138)); Hinrichs v. Gen. Motors of Canada, Ltd., 222 So. 3d 1114, 1122
(Ala. 2016) ("[Tlhe United States Supreme Court in Goodyear recently restricted
the scope of general jurisdiction by requiring that the foreign corporation have
such contacts with the forum state as to be 'at home' there, such as being incorpo-
rated there, having its principal place of business there, or having some other
comparable level of intensity of contact."), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2291 (2017).
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simply took a "fairly high" bar 42 and set it higher.14 3 Finally,
some courts cite to Daimler regarding general jurisdiction but
only ask whether a corporation's activities were continuous
and systematic (and do not mention the two paradigms of mod-
ern general jurisdiction), seemingly applying the doing busi-
ness test from before Daimler.14 4
For the purposes of this Note, the Second Circuit's treat-
ment of general jurisdiction after Daimler is particularly in-
structive because its recent decisions discard any pure
contacts inquiry and instead only assess contacts in conjunc-
tion with a uniqueness factor. The Second Circuit indicated
that an "exceptional case" inquiry is necessarily more than an
absolute or a comparative contacts test because "mere con-
tacts" cannot establish general jurisdiction.1 4 5 Accordingly,
one could argue that the Second Circuit has effectively reduced
the exceptional case to the facts of Perkins because of recent
language focusing on Perkins' "surrogate principal place of
business."l 46 The logical implication may be that the excep-
tional case only exists when a corporation's paradigmatic prin-
cipal place of business has been temporarily invalidated, such
as the wartime consequences of the corporation in Perkins.
That directive, however, has not led all district courts in the
Second Circuit to ignore contacts, implying that some Second
Circuit courts still find contacts instructive regarding a princi-
pal place of business inquiry (in a comparative contacts
142 Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2000), holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et
L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
143 See Congdon, 2017 WL 5069960, at *7.
144 See Lamont v. Pilkington, No. 17-cv-5942-JSC, 2018 WL 2176100, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2018), (citing Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374
F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing numerous "doing business" cases)), report
and recommendation adopted sub nom. Lamont v. Edwards, No. 17-cv-05942-
WHO, 2018 WL 2151701 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2018); Return on Intelligence, Ltd. v.
Shenkman, No. 16-0317, 2017 WL 3310684, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2017); New
Asia Enters. Ltd. v. Fabrique, Ltd., No. 13 Civ. 5271 (JFK), 2014 WL 3950901, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2014) ("A non-domiciliary is subject to general jurisdiction if
it is 'doing business' in New York, meaning it is engaged in continuous, perma-
nent, and substantial activity in New York. Relevant considerations include
whether the defendant (1) maintains a New York office; (2) solicits business in New
York; (3) owns property or bank accounts in New York; or (4) has employees
present within New York." (citations and quotations omitted)).
145 Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 629 (2d Cir. 2016) ("And
so, when a corporation is neither incorporated nor maintains its principal place of
business in a state, mere contacts, no matter how 'systematic and continuous,'
are extraordinarily unlikely to add up to an 'exceptional case.'").
146 See id. ("Lockheed's contacts with Connecticut fall far short of establishing
a 'surrogate principal place of business' such as the Court found in Perkins.").
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scheme).' 4 7 Framing the Second Circuit's logic differently, the
"uniqueness factor" inquiry-distinct from a full-blown reason-
ableness inquiry rejected in Daimler-simply asks whether a
corporation's contacts, plus a hint of something intangible,
render a corporation at home: contacts plus.
B. The Contacts Plus Test
Under a contacts plus test, the exceptional case could be a
conjunctive test requiring a certain (absolute) quantum of con-
tacts and facts similar to Perkins, but not rising to the level of
requiring a "surrogate" principal place of business where the
paradigmatic principal place of business has been temporarily
invalidated.' 4 8 A corporation could be "at home" in its state of
incorporation, its principal place of business, and in the state
or states in which the corporation's contacts satisfy the re-
quirements of the exceptional case, an absolute contacts plus
uniqueness inquiry. The contacts plus test would be useful
because it would shift all contacts inquiries to the exceptional
case, leaving the principal place of business inquiry for the
nerve center test-simplifying the majority of general jurisdic-
tion inquiries. The contacts plus test would also be particu-
larly useful when a court assesses jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation with substantial operations within the United
States but with a foreign headquarters. A hypothetical corpo-
ration incorporated outside the United States, with a head-
quarters outside the United States, could still be within the
scope of general jurisdiction if the corporation's unique interac-
tions with a forum state render the corporation fairly at home
in the state.
The contacts plus test uses a uniqueness inquiry, rather
than a reasonableness inquiry, to demonstrate its distance
from the five-factor Asahi reasonableness test for specific juris-
diction that Justice Sotomayor advocated to be incorporated
147 See, e.g., Retail Pipeline, LLC v. JDA Software Grp., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-
00067, 2018 WL 1621508, at *10 (D. Vt. Mar. 30, 2018) ("The income Defendant
derived from these Vermont clients In fiscal year 2016 totaled $352,508.48, less
than 0.04% of its total annual revenue of approximately $900 million. For fiscal
years 2013 through 2015, less than one-tenth of one percent of Defendant's
revenue came from business in Vermont.").
148 This brings the logic to the brink of a third route: the imposition of a
reasonableness requirement on general jurisdiction similar to that of specific
jurisdiction under Asahi. This, however, is a route often argued but seemingly
never successful. See Brown, 814 F.3d at 630 ("As the Daimler Court observed in
rejecting the same argument, '[wihen a corporation is genuinely at home in the
forum State ... [the Asahi] second-step inquiry would be superfluous.'" (quoting
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20 (2014))).
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into general jurisdiction in Daimler. Accordingly, the contacts
plus test sits between the expansive possibilities for general
jurisdiction under the doing business test and a true reasona-
bleness inquiry on the one end and the confinement of general
jurisdiction to the two paradigmatic examples on the other.
The contacts plus test is distinct from the traditional reasona-
bleness inquiry because it looks only at the defendant's rela-
tionship to the forum, whereas the reasonableness inquiry
considers a plaintiffs interest in litigating in the particular fo-
rum (among other factors). While Justice Ginsburg did de-
scribe the application of a reasonableness step to general
jurisdiction's paradigmatic examples as "superfluous," it is un-
clear if this statement applied to the exceptional case. 149 Ar-
guably, Justice Ginsburg's favorable citation of the "surrogate
place of business" language from von Mehren and Trautman
when discussing Perkins' unique wartime circumstances indi-
cates her acceptance of some form of inquiry akin to the pro-
posed uniqueness inquiry. Following this logic, a corporation
that undertakes substantial corporate direction in two states
could have a principal place of business under the nerve center
test and an exceptional case under the contacts plus test be-
cause of the unique nerve-center activities in the second state.
As described in Parts IV and V, the contacts plus test is in line
with the history of general jurisdiction, draws support from at
least a few jurists, and would ensure national corporations
such as Amazon are not "too big" for general jurisdiction.1 50
IV
POLICY POINTS IN FAVOR OF DISTINCT TREATMENT OF
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS INQUIRIES FOR SUBJECT-MATrER
JURISDICTION AND GENERAL JURISDICTION, BUT THE CONTACTS
PLUS TEST ALLAYS THE CONCERNS
The application of the nerve center test to general jurisdic-
tion's principal place of business derives support from
Daitmler.1 5 1 There are, however, compelling reasons that the
jurisdictional inquiries for principal place of business of sub-
149 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20. See also supra notes 105-06 and accompa-
nying text.
150 IcL
151 See infra notes 158-63; see, e.g., Daimler, 571 U.S. at 130 n.8 (noting that
Perkins "turned" on the fact that "[a]ll of Benguet's activities were directed by the
company's president from within Ohio" (emphasis added)); id. at 157 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) ("The majority does not dispute that a State can exercise general
jurisdiction where a corporate defendant has its corporate headquarters, and
hence its principal place of business within the State.").
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ject-matter jurisdiction and general jurisdiction should be dif-
ferent because underlying policy rationales do not align.152 On
balance, this Note argues that the lower courts' adoption of the
nerve center test for general jurisdiction's principal place of
business inquiry is useful because it simplifies the principal
place of business inquiry in most cases. Should the nerve
center test for general jurisdiction's principal place of business
become settled law, the doctrine can still achieve the survival of
a contacts test and assuage any policy concerns by leaving
open the door for courts to explore general jurisdiction's excep-
tional case as a contacts plus test.
For subject-matter jurisdiction, the federal diversity juris-
diction statute states "a corporation shall be deemed to be a
citizen of every State ... by which it has been incorporated and
of the State . . . where it has its principal place of business."1 53
In 2010, the Court granted certiorari for Hertz Corp. v. Friend to
resolve a circuit split over the interpretation of the phrase
"principal place of business" in that statute.15 4 The Court de-
cided that the nerve center test, "where the corporation's high
level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's
activities,"15 5 was the proper test-at least for the purposes of
diversity jurisdiction.
Hertz said nothing about personal jurisdiction and Daimler
said nothing about nerve centers. The Daimler majority does
mention headquarters, but only in conjunction with reference
to corporate activities such as manufacturing, indicating a con-
tacts inquiry.15 6 Justice Sotomayor's concurrence also men-
tions headquarters using language that implies that a
headquarters is a flavor of contacts. 157
Nevertheless, common readings of Justices Ginsburg's and
Sotomayor's opinions in Daimler endorse applying the nerve
center test to general jurisdiction.15 8 First, Justice Ginsburg
cites to Hertz for the proposition that jurisdictional rules
152 See id. at 147-48.
153 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
154 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010).
155 Id.
156 Dailner AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 123 (2014) ("Daimler is a Ger-
man Aktiengesellschaft (public stock company) that manufactures Merce-
des-Benz vehicles primarily in Germany and has its headquarters in Stuttgart.").
157 Id. at 142 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("The Court acknowledges that Mer-
cedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), Daimler's wholly owned subsidiary, has consid-
erable contacts with California. It has multiple facilities in the State, including a
regional headquarters. Each year, it distributes in California tens of thousands of
cars . . .").
158 See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 73, 148-49.
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should be easily ascertainable.15 9 Justice Sotomayor seems to
recognize this as an endorsement, writing that "[tihe majority
does not dispute that a [sitate can exercise general jurisdiction
where a corporate defendant has its corporate headquarters,
and hence its principal place of business within the state,"
before citing Hertz herself.1 6 0 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg
writes that general jurisdiction was proper in Perkins because
the defendant had "maintained the company's files, and over-
saw the company's activities"161 from Ohio even though the
Court in Perkins explicitly stated that the defendant's activities
in Ohio were a "continuous and systematic, but limited, part of
its general business."l 6 2 Most notably, while sparring with
Justice Sotomayor's interpretation of Perkins, Justice Gins-
burg states "the point on which [Perkins] turned: All of Ben-
guet's activities were directed by the company's president from
within Ohio."163 These data point to the Supreme Court's tacit
approval of the nerve center test for general jurisdiction be-
cause they imply that a corporation's principal place of busi-
ness is the location from which a corporation's activities are
directed.
The policy rationale for adoption of the nerve center test for
principal place of business is less clear. There is, however
indirect, Supreme Court support for the idea that principal
place of business inquiries for general jurisdiction and subject
matter jurisdiction are distinct. For example, in RLIR Nabisco,
Inc. v. European Community,16 4 the Court cited to Hertz in stat-
159 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (Ginsburg, J., majority). Justice Stephen Breyer,
looking at both the legislative history of the federal diversity statute and the goal
of having easily-solved jurisdictional questions, decided that the nerve center test
would be more simply applied than both the gross income test, in which a court
must find whether more than half a corporation's income is derived from a state,
and the general business activities test, in which a court must find whether a
corporation's activities in a state are "'significantly larger' than in the next-rank-
ing state." Hertz, 559 U.S. at 87, 93 (quoting Friend v. Hertz Corp., 297 F. App'x
690, 691 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)).
160 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 157-58 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
161 Id. at 129 (Ginsburg, J., majority).
162 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 438, 438 (1952) (empha-
sis added).
163 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 130 n.8. It could be argued that Justice Sotomayor's
concurrence also hints at an endorsement of the nerve center test. Id. at 148
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that, for jurisdictional purposes, an impor-
tant, unanswered question in the record remains: "Do [Daimler's California em-
ployees] make important strategic decisions or oversee in any manner Daimler's
activities?"). If the direction of activities is critical to a general jurisdiction inquiry,
perhaps an important factor in a uniqueness inquiry is whether substantial cor-
porate direction occurs in more than one state.
164 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
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ing "courts can apply the 'nerve center' test that we use to
determine a corporation's principal place of business for pur-
poses of federal diversity jurisdiction." 6 5 If the Court believed
each principal place of business inquiry were the same, the
qualifier "for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction" would
be meaningless.
Disparate treatment of the two inquiries would make sense
because personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction
stand on different foundations. As Cornett and Hoffheimer as-
sert, the Court in Hertz adopted the nerve center test for rea-
sons that do not apply to general jurisdiction.16 6 First, the
Court relied on legislative history specific to the federal diver-
sity statute, history that advocated for simplicity, and with the
knowledge that Congress could return to the subject should
Congress disagree with the nerve center test interpretation. 167
For general jurisdiction, this logic does not apply. Justice
Ginsburg, elucidating previous general jurisdiction precedent,
wrote the principal place of business language in Daimler to
build on earlier federal precedent rather than to clarify a fed-
eral statute.1 68 Simplicity was not the goal of previous contacts
inquiries, or at least such a goal was not clear from the few
general jurisdiction Supreme Court cases. Moreover, unlike for
subject-matter jurisdiction, the language appears in no federal
statute. Congress is thus not afforded the same opportunity to
rectify any jurisdictional changes they disagree with.
Second, the inclusion of principal place of business in the
subject matter jurisdiction inquiry serves to narrow the scope
of federal jurisdiction while inclusion of principal place of busi-
ness in general jurisdiction does not.1 6 9 Diversity jurisdiction
is a carefully calibrated cog in contemporary federalism, and if
a litigant does not meet the test, a state court will still be
available because of state courts' general jurisdiction. Restrict-
ing personal jurisdiction by adopting the nerve center test
would effectively narrow both federal and state courts' jurisdic-
tion, narrowing the breadth of litigants who could be haled into
165 Id. at 2104.
166 See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 73, at 147-48.
167 Id. at 148 n.226.
168 See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125-39.
169 See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 73, at 148 n.228. For further dis-
cussion on why subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction should re-
ceive different treatment, including discussion of potential infringement on state
sovereignty, see Seungwon Chung, Note, The Shoe Doesn't Fit: General Jurisdic-
tion Should Follow Corporate Structure, 100 MINN. L. REv. 1599, 1624 (2016).
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either court. Simplicity and ease of application should be less
important when the stakes are higher.
Finally, at its core, general jurisdiction is about what Due
Process requires-simplicity likewise seems less important
when answering a constitutional rather than a statutory ques-
tion. The federal diversity statute is a directive from Congress
to narrow the span of cases beyond what the Constitution al-
lows; to treat an inquiry about the outer bounds of Due Process
in the personal jurisdiction context identically would be
counterintuitive.
If a corporation is able to use the definition of principal
place of business to structure their corporate activities in order
to avoid suit in a state completely, then a plaintiffs practical
opportunity to sue the corporation will be substantially af-
fected.170 In 2015, Cornett and Hoffheimer wrote "it is a safe
prediction that corporations will aggressively argue that the
test applies to general personal jurisdiction in cases where it
benefits them," 17 1 and they were not wrong. 1 7 2
Nevertheless, this Note argues that the adoption of the
nerve center test for general jurisdiction's principal place of
business is desirable as long as a contacts inquiry survives in
general jurisdiction's exceptional case. If the exceptional case
is effectively limited to the facts of Perkins, then the nerve
center test would be inappropriate because it would narrow
general jurisdiction well beyond its precedential roots. On the
other hand, if the exceptional case morphs into a contacts plus
test that falls in between the "overexpansion" of the doing busi-
ness test and the over-restriction of a general jurisdiction lim-
ited to the two paradigms, then the problems related to the
adoption of the nerve center would be mollified.
V
AMAZON's HQ2: A THIRD HoME?
Amazon's recent announcement of its plan to build a sec-
ond headquarters, a project it calls HQ2,' 7 3 crystallizes the
current problem with general jurisdiction. With one of
America's largest corporations soon to have an HQ 1 in Wash-
170 See Cornett & Hoffheirner, supra note 73, at 149 ("In contrast, corporations
will certainly seek to structure their activity, including the location of their corpo-
rate headquarters, so as to avoid being subject to general personal jurisdiction.").
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., supra notes 120, 124 and accompanying text.
173 Wingfield & Cohen, supra note 21.
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ington,1 7 4 over 30,000 employees in California, 1 7 5 and up to
50,000 employees in a third, HQ2 state, 7 6 the question of how
the law of personal jurisdiction will respond to our ever-nation-
alizing corporate economy is ripe.
Personal jurisdiction has evolved over time to match the
evolution of society and the economy. Professor Kevin M. Cler-
mont asserts that the "evolution of the common law of territo-
rial jurisdiction has come largely in response to socio-
economic-political pressures, as well as changes in technology
and even philosophy."' 7 7 Over the last century, personal juris-
diction has had to respond to the genesis of car accidents,' 7 8 to
the nuanced realities of modern finance, 7 9 and to the develop-
ment of a modern international economy.' 0 Meanwhile, Amer-
ican social thought has largely shifted from a "laissez-faire
[philosophy] to a social-welfare philosophy."'18 As evidenced
by Goodyear, Daimler, and Bristol-Myers Squibb, however, the
Supreme Court has recently stymied the general trend match-
ing the reach of personal jurisdiction with these societal
changes. This need not be the case; as shown by Justice
Sotomayor's concurrence in Daimler, general jurisdiction juris-
prudence can continue to naturally transform in response to
the modernization of the economy.1 8 2 The contacts plus test
174 ic
175 Clare McGrane, United States of Amazon in 2017: Interactive Graphic
Shows Where the Tech Giant is Growing Now, GEEKWIRE (Feb. 2, 2017, 11:15 AM),
https://www.geekwire.com/2017/united-states-amazon-2017-interactive-
graphic-shows-tech-giant-growing-now/ [https://perma.cc/9KXT-X2WP].
176 Wingfield & Cohen, supra note 21. It looked as though Amazon's HQ2
would actually build its HQ2 and HQ3, with Amazon choosing both New York City
and Arlington County, Virginia for its HQ2 expansion. See Laura Stevens, Keiko
Monis & Katie Honan, Amazon Picks New York City, Northern Virginia for Its HQ2
Locations, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2018, 12:16 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
amazon-chooses-new-york-city-and-northem-virginia-for-additional-headquart
ers-1542075336?ns=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/L53U-JTBC]. Ama-
zon, however, later withdrew its plans for expansion into New York City. J. David
Goodman, Amazon Pulls Out of Planned New York City Headquarters, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/nyregion/amazon-hq2-
queens.html [https://perma.cc/PMU6-KQ36].
177 CLERMONr, supra note 38 at 250.
178 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 353 (1927).
179 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,214 (1977) (holding that Delaware did
not have personal jurisdiction over defendants solely by virtue of defendants
owning stock in company incorporated in Delaware).
180 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980);
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 312-13. (1945).
181 CLERMONT, supra note 38, at 250.
182 See DaimlerAG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 155-57 (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (2014) ("In the era of International Shoe, it was rare for a corporation to have
such substantial nationwide contacts that it would be subject to general jurisdic-
tion in a large number of States. Today, that circumstance is less rare. But that
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would likewise provide the necessary flexibility without contra-
vening Daimler. If a new path is not explored, these recent
decisions may allow national and international corporations to
insulate themselves from lawsuits by choosing where plaintiffs
can sue them.
Such a result would be troubling, especially in an era when
technology companies-offering increasingly intangible goods
and services-are currently in unprecedented control of the
American economy. For example, five American companies-
Apple, Google, Microsoft, Cisco, and Oracle-control over one-
third of all money in the nation. 183 Amazon, not to be outdone,
has the fifth highest market capitalization of any American
corporationl 84 and recently stoked antitrust fears on Capitol
Hill with its purchase of Whole Foods. 8 5
Amazon's announcement of its search for a new state for
its HQ2, and the accompanying five billion dollar investment
that will come with it, has led to a very public auction for
Amazon's favor.' 8 6 Amazon had 238 applications from cities
is as it should be. What has changed since International Shoe is not the due
process principle of fundamental fairness but rather the nature of the global
economy.").
183 Matt Krantz, A Third of Cash Is Held by 5 U.S. Companies, USA TODAY (May
22, 2016, 4:47 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2016/
05/20/third-cash-owned-5-us-companies/84640704/ [https://perma.cc/A4FH-
JP22].
184 Kenneth Kiesnoski, The Top 10 US Companies by Market Capitalization,
CNBC (Mar. 8, 2017, 7:53 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/08/the-top-10-
us-companies-by-market-capitalzation.html#slide=6/ [https://perma.cc/HXN2-
PL74]; see also Max A. Cherney, Amazon Headed for $1.6 Trillion Market Cap,
Analyst Suggests, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 8, 2017, 6:48 AM), https: //www.market
watch.com/story/amazon-headed-for-16-trillion-market-cap-analyst-suggests-
2017-09-07/ [https://perma.cc/DLV3-SEPA] (predicting that Amazon will have a
$1.6 trillion dollar market capitalization by 2025).
185 See Lucinda Shen, This Congressman Is Worried About What Amazon Will
Do with Whole Foods, FoRTuNE (July 14, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/07/14/
amazon-whole-foods-antitrust-stock/ [https://perma.cc/EZ8N-LHUZI ("[House
Judiciary Committee Chairman David Cicillinel noted that the deal raised con-
cerns about Amazon's dominance in general in e-commerce."). But see Nitasha
Tiku, Ready for a Monopoly Fight? Amazon and Whole Foods Isn't It, WIRED (June
20, 2017, 11:22 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-whole-foods-mo-
nopoly-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/ZV5F-2H2L] ("Regulators believe that the
lower prices and increased efficiency that comes from using economies of scale
and scope are a net positive for consumers."). For an argument that antitrust law
needs restructuring in order to properly regulate Amazon, see Lina M. Khan,
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 712-17 (2017).
186 See Nick Wingfield, Amazon Chooses 20 Finalists for Second Headquarters,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/technology/
amazon-finalists-headquarters.html [https://perma.cc/7XJU-4J8C]; Nellie
Bowles, For Cities Wooing Amazon's New Headquarters, Nothing Is Too Strange,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/technology/
wooing-amazon-second-headquarters.html/ [https://perma.cc/S2LD-4TSK].
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wishing to be the location of Amazon's HQ2 and the accompa-
nying economic vitalization. 18 7 Amazon has said that it needs
to expand to a second headquarters because it has outgrown
its original home in Seattle, promising levels of investment that
would forever transform any metropolitan area.I'8  States have
put forth various economic plans to lure Amazon, such as New
Jersey's proposal to give up to seven billion dollars in tax incen-
tives to have Amazon come to Newark.' 8 9 State officials like
Governor Terry McAuliffe of Virginia have openly campaigned
for Amazon's HQ2, 90 and the New York Times reported court-
ing tactics that included "[b]usiness leaders in Tucson . . .
mail[ing] Amazon's chief executive, Jeff Bezos, a 21-foot cac-
tus."19 1 It is clear that Amazon will derive a lot of benefit from
moving its operations into a new state; the underlying policy
rationales of personal jurisdiction dictate that Amazon's receipt
of benefits from a state should have the reciprocal effect of
subjecting it to suit in that state.1 9 2
Despite Amazon's broad reach into millions of Americans'
daily lives, current general jurisdiction jurisprudence dictates
that plaintiffs can only sue Amazon by invoking specific juris-
diction or suing where Amazon is at home: its state of incorpo-
ration and its principal place of business. Amazon is
incorporated in Delaware,1 9 3 far from a plaintiff-friendly juris-
diction like California.1 94 Thus, how a court decides where
Amazon's principal place of business is-and whether Amazon
has an exceptional third home-is critical.
187 Wingfield, supra note 186.
188 Id.
189 Id
190 Terry McAuliffe (@TerryMcAuliffe), TWITTER (Jan. 18, 2018, 6:53 AM),
https://twitter.com/TerryMcAuliffe/status/954003943218171906/ [https://per
ma.cc/SJ96-DML7] ("BIG: Northern VA is finalist for @Amazon HQ2! Thx to all
who put in hard work to get us here. Let's close the deal and bring it home!").
191 Bowles, supra note 186 ("'It's like "The Amazing Race,"' said Jim Watson,
the mayor of Ottawa. 'You've got this cast of characters running toward the Holy
Grail.'").
192 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 156 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) ("Just as it was fair to say in the 1940s that an out-of-state company could
enjoy the benefits of a forum State enough to make it 'essentially at home' in the
State, it is fair to say today that a multinational conglomerate can enjoy such
extensive benefits in multiple forum States that it is 'essentially at home' in each
one.").
193 Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 17, 2003).
194 The American Tort Reform Foundation currently has California listed as
number two on its list of "Judicial hellholes," while Delaware is listed as a "point of
light." AM. TORT REFORM FoUND., JuDIcIAL HELLHOLES: 2016-2017, 9, 54 (2016)
www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/JudicialHellholes-
2016.pdf [www.perma.cc/NS6N-DULK].
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Before Amazon builds its HQ2, the personal jurisdiction
hypothetical is relatively simple. If courts apply the traditional,
absolute contacts test, 195 then Amazon's principal place of
business would likely be California. 19 6 Justice Ginsburg's
opinion in Daimler essentially states that a corporation can
only have one principal place of business, 197 so there could be
a debate between California and Washington depending on the
type of in-state activity the court looks to, but the choice would
be binary.1 98 Whichever state a court did not deem Amazon's
principal place of business would have an argument to fall into
the exceptional case, but the argument would almost certainly
be a losing one (under current exceptional case jurisprudence).
Hertz similarly forecloses the option of having more than one
nerve center.19 9 Thus, should courts currently apply the nerve
center test to Amazon pre-HQ2, plaintiffs could almost cer-
tainly sue Amazon in Washington, but Amazon would be insu-
lated from suit in California despite employing over 30,000 in-
state employees. 200
After Amazon completes HQ2, the personal jurisdiction hy-
pothetical becomes more complex and less equitable when con-
sidering general jurisdiction's history of expansion. Should
courts apply an absolute contacts test, Amazon's principal
195 See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20 (2014) (clarifying that the new "at home"
test is more restrictive than the "doing business" test in that it takes a corpora-
tion's contacts with a state in relation to its "activities in their entirety, nationwide
and worldwide," such that a corporation will almost always be at home in only one
or two states). Even after Daimler lessened the breadth of the doing business test
courts could still use the operations test to come to this result, though the partic-
ular differences between the traditional doing business test and the modem oper-
ations (business activity test) would likely need to be explained and refined. The
most relevant difference after Daimler is that there can (almost certainly) only be
one solution to the question of principal place of business, whereas before Daimler
(and Goodyear) it was an open question whether the question allowed multiple
solutions.
196 For the sake of this analysis, I will assume that courts would find Califor-
nia to be Amazon's principal place of business under the operations test.
197 Moreover, Hertz held that a corporation could have only one principal place
of business and so courts that apply Hertz to principal place of business for
personal jurisdiction agree that the term is necessarily singular. See McCullough
v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1346 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 2017)
(citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010)), appeal dismissed, No. 18-
10327-DD, 2018 WL 2047457 (11th Cir. Feb. 21, 2018); cf. Smith v. Kansas City
S. Ry. Co., 214 So. 3d 272, 276 (Miss. 2017) ("We now find that a corporation may
have only one principal place of business [for purposes of venue]."). But see
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 ("[State of incorporation and principal place of business]
have the virtue of being unique-that is, each ordinarily indicates only one
place. . . ." (emphasis added)).
198 See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138-39.
199 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93-95 (2010).
200 McGrane, supra note 175.
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place of business would be California. Thus, Delaware and
California could assert personal jurisdiction over Amazon, but
neither Washington nor the state in which HQ2 is built could.
Should courts apply the nerve center test, Amazon's principal
place of business would likely be Washington (or perhaps the
location of HQ2). Delaware and Washington could assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over Amazon, but neither California nor the
state in which HQ2 is built could.
Under either test, the problem is that Amazon would be
insulated from suit in two states that would have very likely
had general jurisdiction over Amazon prior to Daimler. Addi-
tionally, under either test, Justice Ginsburg's comparative con-
tacts test will likely yield the same results while only making
the possibility of an exceptional case (or second principal place
of business) less likely. Amazon would become a demonstra-
tion of Justice Sotomayor's argument in Dqimler, that the com-
parative contacts test and limitation to two at-home states
essentially insulates national corporations from general
jurisdiction. 2 0 1
Moreover, the application of the nerve center test will allow
corporations to select a nerve center in anticipation of litiga-
tion, engaging in a brand of ex ante forum shopping. Justice
Sotomayor recognized just such a problem in her Daimler con-
currence, writing that "the majority's approach unduly curtails
the States' sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes against
corporate defendants who have engaged in continuous and
substantial business operations within their boundaries."20 2
Justice Sotomayor hypothesized that the Daimler opinion
would allow a corporation to split its managerial functions
across three states, deem one state its nominal corporate head-
quarters, and avoid general jurisdiction in two states with
which it is in continuous and systematic contact.203 This is
very similar to the situation we will soon face with Amazon.
Logically, Amazon will attempt to structure its corporate activ-
201 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
202 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 157 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
203 Id. at 157-58 ("If the State where the headquarters is located can exercise
general jurisdiction, why should the other two States be constitutionally forbid-
den to do the same? Indeed, under the majority's approach, the result would be
unchanged even if the company has substantial operations within the latter two
States (and even if the company has no sales or other business operations in the
first State). Put simply, the majority's rule defines the Due Process Clause so
narrowly and arbitrarily as to contravene the States' sovereign prerogative to
subject to judgment defendants who have manifested an unqualified 'intention to
benefit from and thus an intention to submit to the[ir] laws.'" (quoting J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (plurality opinion))).
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ity as to choose the most defense-friendly state for its nerve
center and thus insulate itself from suit in states that should
be able to exert general jurisdiction. 2 0 4
VI
A POTENTIAL PATH FORWARD: THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE
AS CONTACTS PLUS
This Note identifies the contacts plus test in order to follow
Justice Sotomayor's suggestion in Daimler of expanding the
exceptional case in which a corporation is at home in more
than its state of incorporation and its principal place of busi-
ness while remaining mindful of Justice Ginsburg's warning
that a corporation cannot be deemed at home in all states in
which it conducts business. This solution would be possible
without "stretch[ing] general jurisdiction beyond limits tradi-
tionally recognized" 2 0 5 and without preventing corporations
"[from] structur[ing] their primary conduct with some mini-
mum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit."2 0 6 Plaintiffs would be able to sue
Amazon in their HQ2 state, but not in all fifty states. This Part
examines the jurisprudential foundation for such a test, both
by analogy to recent Supreme Court precedent discussing
physical presence and internet sales tax and by reference to
current support such a test has among jurists. The Part then
applies the contacts plus test to Amazon's HQ2 as a demon-
stration of the test's utility.
The contacts plus test would be in line with pre-Daimler
general (and personal) jurisdiction precedent. Justice
Sotomayor's reasoning adheres closest to pre-Daimler prece-
dent, which is characterized by a much more forgiving contacts
test. The test simply looked at whether contacts were "of the
sort that approximate physical presence." 2 07 Factors that
pointed in the direction of the exercise of general jurisdiction
included, among others, "whether the defendant makes sales,
solicits or engages in business in the state, serves the state's
markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a
204 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 73, at 149 ("In contrast, corporations will
certainly seek to structure their activity, including the location of their corporate
headquarters, so as to avoid being subject to general personal jurisdiction.").
205 DaTiler, 571 U.S. at 132.
206 Id. at 139 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
207 Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2000), holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et
L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
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license, or is incorporated there."208 As such, Justice Gins-
burg's announcement of the two paradigmatic examples of gen-
eral jurisdiction in Daimler comports with previous precedent,
but the raising of the jurisdictional bar to nearly insurmounta-
ble heights does not. 2 09
The contacts plus test's flexibility to permit the expansion
of general jurisdiction alongside the modem economy is in line
with the doctrine's roots in International Shoe. As the economy
continues to modernize, personal jurisdiction would remain
tethered to traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice-national and multinational corporations who derive
unique benefit from doing business in more than two states
would be subject to suit in more than two states. Corporations
this expansive were simply much more rare in the age of Pen-
noyer the doctrine should not remain static or reverse while
the entities it governs evolve.
Ironically, 2 10 one of the most recent enunciations of advo-
cacy for this position comes from a state supreme court dis-
senting opinion on a topic straight out of the age of Pennoyer
railroads. In 2017, Justice Martha Lee Walters of the Oregon
Supreme Court wrote a dissent in Barrett v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Co. arguing that exercise of general jurisdiction over a
railroad in more than twenty states was well in line with tradi-
tional, Pennoyer-ian understandings of general jurisdiction. 2 1 1
That case involved a negligence claim by a railroad employee,
stemming from a personal injury, under the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act. 2 1 2 The court held that Oregon courts could
not exercise general jurisdiction over Union Pacific because
Daimler dictated a comparative contacts test that requires
more than substantial contacts. 213 This was despite the fact
that Union Pacific "employs 1,700 persons in Oregon, has an
208 icL
209 See Air Tropiques, Sprl v. N. & W. Ins. Co., No. H-13-1438, 2014 WL
1323046, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014) ("Before Daimler, NWIC might have
been subject to general jurisdiction in this forum.").
210 The Union Pacific Railroad, a corporation derivative of the very same that
President Abraham Lincoln directed to help build the transcontinental railroad in
1862-sixteen years before the Court decided Pennoyer-was a party in the re-
cent, important personal jurisdiction case Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
390 P.3d 1031, 1041-42 (Or. 2017). Chronological History, UNION PACIFIC, https:/
/www.up.com/aboutup/history/chronology/index.htm/ [https://perma.cc/
24S7-47AG].
211 Barrett, 390 P.3d at 1041-42 (Walters, J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 1032-33 (Kistler, J., majority opinion).
213 Id. at 1036 ("To paraphrase the Court's reasoning in Dainler, if Oregon can
exercise general jurisdiction over Union Pacific because that company's activities
in this state are substantial and continuous, then every state in which Union
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annual Oregon payroll of $144.6 million, owns and operates
almost 1,100 miles of track throughout the state, and gener-
ates over $645 million annually in revenue from its Oregon
operations." 2 14
Justice Walters, in dissent, reasoned that, at least from
Pennoyer to Daimler, state courts "had undisputed jurisdiction
to protect their residents from injuries inflicted by railroads
that owned tracks and conducted substantial business within
their borders" regardless of states of incorporation or principal
places of business. 2 15 Looking then at Daimler, Justice Walters
concluded that the case was an example of the exceptional
case. 2 16 The case, then, is a roadmap to the potential expan-
sion of general jurisdiction via contacts plus and the explora-
tion of the exceptional case.
Justice Walters' reasoning is worth examination. She be-
gins by isolating four rationales underlying Daimler general
jurisdiction should not stretch beyond traditional limits; 2 1 7
there are two paradigmatic examples because they are "unique
and easily ascertainable"; 2 1 8 simply substantial contacts is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction because corporations neces-
sarily must retain the ability to predict liability to suit with
"some minimum assurance"; 2 19 and courts cannot expand per-
sonal jurisdiction to the detriment of international comity. 2 2 0
Justice Walters' dispositions of the first and last rationales are
simple. First, she reasons that Daimler did not hold that Pen-
noyer's territorial approach was completely incorrect today, but
only that it was not determinative-such a ruling would not
expand traditional general jurisdiction.22 1 Second, the inter-
national comity rationale is certainly less applicable in the con-
text of a suit against a domestic railroad than it was in Daimler,
Pacific has engaged in similar activities can assert general jurisdiction over it land
Daimler forbids this result].").
214 Id. at 1036.
215 Id. at 1043 (Walters, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 1045 ("The general jurisdictional opening that the Court preserved
in Daimler may be slim, but the principles of dual sovereignty at play here should
permit these plaintiffs to step through.").
217 Id. at 1043 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 131 (2014)).
218 Id. (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136).
219 Id. at 1043-44 (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 (citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985))).
220 Id. at 1044.
221 See id. at 1044 ("It would be far more novel to preclude Oregon from
exercising jurisdiction in this case than it would be to permit it.").
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a suit against a foreign corporation. 2 2 2 Both arguments would
apply with equal force to the case of Amazon.
Justice Walters' approaches to the second and third ratio-
nales, however, are more complex; they effectively turn the
common reading of Daimler on its head. She advocates for the
adoption of a threshold contacts test for the exceptional case,
points out that corporations are not logically "at home" in their
states of incorporation because they do no business there, and
argues that a contacts test for principal place of business
would be too complex. 223 In Barrett, for example, the defen-
dant had the highest number of employees and greatest length
of track in Texas but the defendant argued that its principal
place of business was Nebraska. 224 At the core of Justice Wal-
ters' reasoning is International Shoe and the idea that Due
Process is about fairness and a state's authority. Rather than
focusing on contacts, "[she] rellies], instead, on Oregon's right
to protect one of its residents from harm done by a corporation
with a permanent, physical presence here, that is, by its na-
ture, unique." 2 2 5 Railroads are unique because in order to do
business in a state they must physically, and therefore con-
sciously, enter that state-to say that they cannot reasonably
gain awareness of or plan for liability to suit would be counter-
intuitive, she argues. 226
These arguments also apply to the case of Amazon and
show why a reconsideration of general jurisdiction jurispru-
dence is in order. A contacts test for principal place of business
would be counter to the simplicity sought-to hold, however,
that the exceptional case was dictated by a threshold contacts
test with an inquiry for that "something more" would recreate
the simplicity desired. Barrett would come out the other way,
and all railroad corporations would know that they are liable to
suit in states in which they lay tracks. Domestic companies
such as Amazon would argue that the "something more" in-
quiry would create uncertainty, but that should be a losing
argument because a few court decisions would signal to Ama-
zon that it was subject to more than two states' personal
jurisdiction.
222 See td. at 1045 ("It would be rare for a multinational corporation to own
tracks or operate railroads in the United States or in Oregon, and if it did, it would
do so with notice of FELA's jurisdictional reach.").
223 See id. at 1044.
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 See id. at 1044-45.
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Amazon's presence is permanent, physical, and unique-a
state should have the power to protect its citizens from harms
the corporation commits. In 2017, the corporation accounted
for 44% of all U.S. e-commerce 2 2 7 and pulled in over 50 billion
dollars of revenue. 228 Assessing it based on the pre-Daimler
factors, Amazon makes sales, engages in business in the state,
and serves the state's markets. Amazon would have likely
passed the pre-Daimler test, so Daimler should be understood
in a way that Amazon still passes.
Moreover, recent factual and legal developments also point
to the propriety of general jurisdiction over Amazon. First, Am-
azon's expansion into new markets demonstrates its inextrica-
ble link to states' markets. Before Daimler, the Ninth Circuit
wrote that "engaging in commerce with residents of the forum
state is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approxi-
mates physical presence within the state's borders."2 29 Ama-
zon's expansion, however, demonstrates that they do more
than simply engaging in basic commerce. Amazon now owns
the grocer Whole Foods, 2 3 0 is in the process of becoming a
major player in the pharmaceutical industry, 23 1 and has physi-
cal fulfillment centers in thirty states. 232 It has physical offices
in fifty-two locations in the United States, in twenty-eight
states. 2 3 3 According to Justice Walsh's logic in Barrett, Ama-
zon's physical presence in these states could be treated as
227 Lauren Thomas, Amazon Grabbed 4 Percent ofAll U.S. Retail Sales in 2017,
New Study Says, CNBC (Jan. 3, 2018, 9:05 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/
01 /03/amazon-grabbed-4-percent-of-all-us-retail-sales-in-2017-new-study.html
[https://perma.cc/4HF4-687S].
228 Eugene Kim, Amazon Misses on Revenue but Earnings Came in More Than
Double What the Street Expected, CNBC (July 26, 2018, 9:16 PM), https://www
.cnbc.com/2018/07/26/amazon-earnings-q2-2018.html [https://perma.cc/
6F7U-J3TV].
229 Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2000), holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et
L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
230 See Lauren Hirsch, A Year After Amazon Announced Its Acquisition of
Whole Foods, Here's Where We Stand, CNBC (June 15, 2018, 6:56 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/06/15/a-year-after-amazon-announced-whole-foods-deal-
heres-where-we-stand.html [https://perma.cc/4WQH-CQB2].
231 See Anthony Mirhaydari, Here's the Reason Why Amazon Is Diving into
Health Care, CBS: MONEYWATCH (July 2, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews
.com/news/why-amazon-is-diving-into-healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/F93W-
HPKH].
232 Dennis Green & Anaele Pelisson, This Map of Amazon's Warehouse Loca-
tions Shows How It's Taking Over America, Bus. INSIDER (Sep. 27, 2017, 12:16 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-warehouse-locations-in-us-2017-9/
[https://perma.cc/Y2H6-CGDA].
233 Find Jobs by Location, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.jobs/locations/?&
continent=northamerica&cache/ [https://perma.cc/SL23-7J34].
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Justice Walsh treats the rail lines' physical presence. In terms
of the contacts plus test, Amazon's contacts would surely be
substantial enough and their "something more" could be their
participation in vast and disparate areas of the modem econ-
omy or the pervasiveness of their enterprise.
Since Daimler, the legal argument that a corporation such
as Amazon, functioning primarily as an online retailer, would
be subject to pre-Daitmler general jurisdiction has strength-
ened. Before Daimler, the Ninth Circuit noted that a corpora-
tion was not subject to general jurisdiction because the
corporation "pa[id] no taxes," had no advertising, and its web-
site was "'passive,' i.e., consumers [could] not use it to make
purchases." 2 34 Certainly Amazon has advertisements 235 and
its website is an active marketplace. 2 36
The taxation argument has moved recently to point even
more strongly towards the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., the Court overruled over fifty
years of precedent in holding that a retailer need not maintain
a physical presence in a state in order for their sales to be
subject to a state's sales tax.2 3 7 The physical presence rule
dictated that "[ulnless the retailer maintained a physical pres-
ence such as 'retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a
State,' the State lacked the power to require that retailer to
collect a local use tax."2 3 8 In fact, such a rule had once been
based on the Due Process Clause, similar to personal jurisdic-
tion doctrine.2 39 In Wayfair, the Court recognized that a rule
linking taxation to physical presence was antiquated, given the
development of the modem economy.2 40 The Court was not
equivocal: "The Internet's prevalence and power have changed
the dynamics of the national economy." 24 1 In addition, the
234 Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086.
235 See, e.g., Alexa Loses Her Voice - Amazon Super Bowl II Commerial, You
TUBE (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J6-8DQALGt4/
[https://perma.cc/22A6-DKTK}.
236 AMAZON, https://amazon.com/ [https://perma.cc/CBU3-NCYVI (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2019).
237 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
238 Id. at 2091.
239 Id. at 2091-92 ("Despite the fact that [National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Rev., 386 U.S. 753 (1967)] linked due process and the Commerce Clause
together, the Court in [Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)] overruled
the due process holding, but not the Commerce Clause holding; and it thus reaf-
firmed the physical presence rule.").
240 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 ("Each year, the physical presence rule be-
comes further removed from economic reality and results in significant revenue
losses to the States.").
241 Id. at 2097.
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Justices of the Supreme Court have been contemplating the
"far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy"
the Internet has had for some time. 2 4 2
The same logic should apply to personal jurisdiction be-
cause the same changes have likewise made personal jurisdic-
tion antiquated in the context of the Internet. Both doctrines
were once based on physical presence, and actual physical
presence should likewise be stricken from each. In fact, Inter-
national Shoe itself equated the two doctrines' foundational
underpinnings when the Court stated "[tlo say that the corpo-
ration is so far 'present' there as to satisfy due process require-
ments, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits
against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be
decided." 2 43 This outcome would be in line with pre-Daimler
general jurisdiction because courts treated presence for juris-
dictional purposes equivalently to presence for other purposes:
"Unless a defendant's contacts with a forum are so substantial,
continuous, and systematic that the defendant can be deemed
to be 'present' in that forum for all purposes [general jurisdic-
tion does not lie] . . . ."244
Even if the Court did not wish to move away from Dainlets
declaration that "la] corporation that operates in many places
can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them," 245 the con-
struction of Amazon's HQ2 exemplifies the need to explore gen-
eral jurisdiction's exceptional case. It would be hard to argue
that Amazon's HQ2 would not pass the contacts plus test.
Taking Perkins as the textbook example of the exceptional
case,24 6 the corporation in Perkins had sufficient contacts plus
the fact that it needed to hold a makeshift headquarters in
Ohio because of World War 11.247 Amazon's HQ2 should pass
the contacts threshold because its contacts dwarf those of the
242 Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
243 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added).
Allan Erbsen recently noted this same internal inconsistency between the Court's
decision in Wayfair and its specific jurisdiction decision in J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). See Allan Erbsen, Wayfair Undermines
Nicastro: The Constitutional Connection Between State Tax Authority and Personal
Jurisdiction, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 724, 724-27 (2019). Put simply, "Wayfair war-
rants rethinking the Court's excessively restrictive approach to personal jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 727.
244 Yahoot Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
245 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 140 n.20 (2014).
246 Id at 139 n.19.
247 See id. at 129 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
448 (1952)).
1130 [Vol. 104:1085
HERTZ SO GOOD
corporation in Perkins and because Amazon is a uniquely ubiq-
uitous corporation that has a (potentially injurious) profound
effect upon a state's citizens. The contacts plus test could also
take into account the fact that much of Amazon's corporate
direction will be bifurcated; both headquarters will undertake
substantial nerve-center activities and so both may merit gen-
eral jurisdiction.
Under the contacts plus test, Amazon would be subject to
general jurisdiction in Delaware, its state of incorporation, and
in Washington, its nerve center. Amazon would also be subject
to general jurisdiction in its HQ2 state, meeting the contacts
plus test under the exceptional case. Beyond that, it might be
subject to jurisdiction in additional states, but not in all states.
For example, Amazon's activities in California are substantial,
but are perhaps not unique. This doctrinal middle ground
would ensure that general jurisdiction evolves with the modem
economy, would provide general predictability, and would not
expand general jurisdiction to the point where the average cor-
poration would have more than two general jurisdiction states.
CONCLUSION
With the Court's increased skepticism of the links between
claims and in-state activities for the purposes of specific juris-
diction, as evidenced by Bristol-Myers Squibb, it is more likely
that plaintiffs will attempt to hale corporations into court
under general rather than specific jurisdiction. Such a strat-
egy, however, may be foreclosed by the Court's reluctance to
expand general jurisdiction beyond the current two paradig-
matic examples-the only states with general jurisdiction over
corporations are the corporations' states of incorporation and
their principal places of business. If the courts adhere to the
idea that corporations only have one principal place of busi-
ness-whether under a contacts test or the Hertz nerve center
test-then it is arguably time for the Court to flesh out the
elusive exceptional circumstances in which corporations can
be "at home" in more than two states. While courts should not
abandon the idea that corporations should be able to reasona-
bly anticipate the courts in which they might be sued, general
jurisdiction jurisprudence should not be a shield that insulates
national and multinational corporations from general jurisdic-
tion in all states but the two that the corporation chooses.
Amazon's development of HQ2 demonstrates the utility of this
principle. Amazon will be at home in at least three states after
building HQ2, and thus Amazon should reasonably expect to
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be subject to suit in all three states. In order to strike the right
balance while adhering to historical and modem precedent,
this Note argued that the contacts plus test would be the most
useful path forward. The Court must periodically intervene in
the perpetual battle between plaintiffs and corporations over
personal jurisdiction, especially when one side has secured a
competitive advantage. The time for such intervention has
likely arrived.
